

# ProfLotz, Phl 421: Sartre, Chapter ONE, Being and Nothingness

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## Section ONE+TWO

1. S rejects the duality of appearance and being
  - a. Illusion/being
  - b. Appearance/essence (concept)
  - c. Act/potency
2. Phenomenon and being must be on “one level”
  - a. Finite/infinite
    - i. Husserl: we nevertheless have access to “essences” as the principle of a series of phenomenal instantiations (Husserl: *Abschattung*)
      1. Example: red
      2. Example: perception of chair
  - b. Phenomenon can be described (since we do not need to “look” behind); this leads to phenomenology; we do not need explanatory accounts of phenomena (via expression or causality)
3. Being cannot be a “predicate” or “quality” of the phenomenon (see also Kant)
4. Being cannot itself be a phenomenon (as otherwise it would be part of a series and it would be in need of a principle) → infinite regress
  - a. Being must be the condition of the phenomenon
  - b. S calls this the “transphenomenality of being”
  - c. The access to being must be *immediate*
  - d. Being cannot be accessed via knowledge
  - e. The being of the phenomenon must be “disclosed”


## Section THREE

1. S rejects Berkeley’s *esse est percipi*; main point: knowledge is not an object of perception; it cannot be subjected to *esse est percipi*
2. Consequence: knowledge must be transphenomenal
3. All knowledge must refer to consciousness (via Husserl), for if knowledge would not somehow know of itself, nothing would be known (by anyone)
4. Consciousness cannot be a particular knowledge, as otherwise it would be a specific act, such as thinking, remembering, etc.
5. The being of consciousness = consciousness
6. THESIS: consciousness must “know” itself, but it cannot be knowledge “turned back upon itself” (11)
7. Consciousness
  - a. Intentionality
  - b. is consciousness *of* something
  - c. transcending
  - d. TH: Must be “conscious of itself” for *being* this consciousness of (11)
8. Self-Consciousness
  - a. Consciousness cannot be positional knowledge of itself, i.e., cannot be

- i. Intentional
  - ii. Proposition (knowing that 'x' is the case)
  - iii. → Infinite regress!!!
- b. Self-consciousness must be a self-relation that is
  - i. Immediate
  - ii. Non-cognitive (12)
  - iii. "non-thetic" (13)
- c. Example: counting cigarettes (what else would you count, dude? Remember: we are in France at the end of WWII)
- d. Self-consciousness, i.e., the non-intentional *being* of intentionality, i.e., it is like the principle of a series (here, again, S rejects the act/potency model that he also rejects in *Existentialism is a Humanism*) (15)

### Consequences

1. Consciousness must be "consciousness through and through" (15), i.e., it cannot be intransparent, or have "gaps" (although its being is "revealed" and not known)
2. Already at this point, it is clear that S rejects certain simplistic accounts of consciousness, such as mechanistic or simplistic psychoanalytic concepts of consciousness that determine consciousness as an "effect" of something else
3. Consciousness is *absolute* (i.e., it cannot be explained via nature or via God)
4. Consciousness is always *its existence*, i.e., it *is* how it actualizes itself
5. The being of consciousness *and* the being of the phenomena is/are *pre-reflective*



# ProfLotz, Phl421, Sartre, The Origin of the Negation, Session I

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1. Sartre in interview: the goal of BN is to demonstrate how one can understand human freedom *and* its being in reality without falling back onto idealism or determinist mechanism.
2. Repeat
  - a. We now have two transphenomenalities: the being of consciousness and the being of the phenomena: consciousness “is” and phenomena “are” → beyond idealism and realism
  - b. Both the in-itself and self-consciousness are *absolute*; they cannot be derived from anything else in a genetic way
  - c. We could argue that the in-itself is made *possible* by something else, but S argues that the concept of possibility belongs to consciousness and that this assumption would not solve anything, insofar as that which makes the in-itself possible itself has “to be”
  - d. Consciousness depends upon the it-self, insofar as phenomena have to “be” in order to be revealed as the “of” of consciousness
  - e. The in-itself is not sufficient, insofar as we cannot think a universe without *differentiation*; so, the in-itself (since it is *phenomenon*) needs to appear *for* someone
  - f. The for-itself can only be insofar as it is *not* in-itself, i.e., it must be a *self-relation*, i.e, a *self-negation*: *it can only be itself because it is not itself*
3. Summary
  - a. “Sartre's central claims are that nothingness belongs to the fabric of reality, and that the possibility of real nothingness is explained by the identity of consciousness with nothingness. Sartre's argument for the theory can be understood as proceeding in four stages: (1) Negation is an irreducible and necessary component and condition of cognition, but cannot be reduced to a function of judgement. (2) Negation is ontologically real: its reality is attested phenomenologically, for we discover nothingness as a concrete object of experience. (3) The reality of nothingness must be regarded as deriving from consciousness' power to negate. (4) Consideration of other theories of nothingness - those of Hegel and Heidegger - leads us to conclude that consciousness has the power to negate because *consciousness is nothingness.*” (Gardner 2009, 61)
4. Negation
  - a. If there is only the in-itself, then don't we have to assume that “non-being” cannot be located on the side of being; instead, we would need to claim that it is only “present” in judgments *about* the in-itself
  - b. THESIS: The upshot of the readings for today is that Sartre tries to show that non-being can be experienced; it is pre-linguistic and pre-judgmental; it must be located on the side of the phenomena, insofar as something can be *experienced AS* non-being; so, *although non-being needs subjectivity to be revealed, it cannot be reduced to subjectivity*
5. S argues that so far he remained abstract, since he has not yet demonstrated how consciousness and the in-itself form a totality

6. Ontological “source” of consciousness = nothingness (34)
7. Totality (34)
  - a. Heidegger: being-in-the-world
  - b. Sartre: relation between consciousness and the in-itself + cannot be reflective
  - c. So, we are looking for a totality that is transparent on the level of concrete human existence in the world
8. The questioner (35)
  - a. Questioning presupposes some pre-reflective familiarity with the relation between “man” and world
  - b. Every question presupposes some familiarity with yes and *no*
  - c. For example, “What’s wrong with the computer?” Perhaps the answer is: “It’s not plugged in.” Perhaps one of the memory chips has failed (that is, it’s not working any more). Perhaps there’s nothing wrong with the computer — it’s supposed to do that! All of these are negative replies that presuppose something negative about the computer itself. (from Spade, online)
9. Non-being (36)
  - a. The answer to the question might be negative
  - b. The questioner is in a state of not-knowing
  - c. Truth is limited by non-truth
  - d. So, he wants to say that we have some pre-linguistic “familiarity” with non-being
10. Example: money
  - a. There ARE 1300 dollars in my pocket
  - b. I expected 1500 dollars in my pocket
  - c. I judge: there *are only* 1300 dollars in my pocket
  - d. S argues that the “only” indicates the experience of “not 1500” *as the basis* of my judgement
11. Judgments
  - a. Is non-being propositional and exclusively tied to judgments *about* phenomena?
    - i. Non-being must be related to experience (intentionality), but S argues that this does not mean that non-being is “subjective” (38)
    - ii. Judgments are the result of questions, but questions can be non-linguistic
    - iii. I can question “the carburetor” because “I consider it possible that ‘there is nothing there’” (39); so, S follows that we have a “pre-judicative comprehension of non-being” (39)
12. Example: destruction
  - a. Must be related to human existence, i.e., the for-itself and transcendence (something or someone must transcend the in-itself → differentiation)
    - i. Activity
    - ii. Something else
    - iii. No longer
    - iv. Is an “objective” fact and does not come into being through intentionality; I experience the destruction as “less than before” because destruction *is* the possibility of “being gone” 40
13. Example: Pierre in the café

- a. Is the “absence” of P in the café the result of a judgment alone, or is the judgment possible because the in-itself somehow shows that P *is not* there
  - b. P’s absence *is detected* by perception and searching in the café; despite the “fullness” and “positivity” of the phenomena, P *is seen as not being there*
  - c. Many people are absent in the café: Wellington is not there either, but, S argues, this is based on an abstract thought, whereas the absence of P is *experienced*, i.e., belongs to intentionality (and therefore to the phenomena)
  - d. Husserl in *Analyses of Passive Syntheses + Experience and Judgement*: claims something similar to S: we *perceive* that something is not there, otherwise than expected, or different than before (think of truth reversals)
14. Upshot
- a. The “not” cannot simply belong to the mind as an organizing category 43
  - b. The “not-being” is like the it-self, i.e., it is a way in which the phenomena are experienced in many ways: hate, regret, prohibitions, loss, absence, fear, death
  - c. S calls these experiences *negatites* (55)
  - d. Transcendence must be based on the possibility of non-being (52)
  - e. The for-itself is itself *negative*, insofar as it surpasses the in-itself (52)
15. What’s coming (hold your breath):
- a. Nothingness cannot somehow be generated by the in-itself (remember: being just “is;” it does not do anything)
  - b. Absences, lacks, destructions, limits, etc. can only be discovered by the for-itself because the for-itself must itself be characterized by lack, i.e., by the non-being; in fact, S argues that the for-itself is the non-being
  - c. So, since being cannot “differentiate” itself, the differentiation, i.e., the negation must come through something that being *is not*, which, acc to Sartre, is the for-itself
  - d. Historically: S comes very close to Fichte who also claims that the being can only be negated by something (self-consciousness) that *is not*; i.e. whose essence *is the negation*

#### Terminology:

1. Non-being and nothingness are used interchangeably
2. Negation refers to the “activity” of the for-itself
3. Negatites: experiences of non-being, such as lack, limit, falseness, reversals, surprises, only, no longer, etc.,
4. Nihilation: something turns into nothing; i.e. to nihilate nothingness = to constitute it (“double”)

# ProfLotz, Phl421: Sartre, Fall 2017, Origin of Nothingness, Handout 3

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1. Where are we
  - a. If we are going to be able to grasp adequately what is going on when we encounter *négatités* in our experience of the world, we are eventually going to have to turn to examine consciousness (next chapters on the for-itself).
  - b. The in-itself is pure positivity; there is “no space” for not-being
  - c. So, there must be a being that is not characterized by “in-itself,” which is the for-itself
  - d. The for-itself is something paradoxical, insofar as it *must be negation* (Fichte: the ego is *pure activity*)
  - e. Thought experiment: extend the café/Pierre example to the entire universe: in order for not-being to be possible in the universe, there must be one being that is not only discovering “negatites” but also itself be characterized by non-being (i.e., it exists as negation; its essence is to negate itself!)
  - f. The for-itself *is* not-being; it is wrong to characterize it as “is” or as “in-itself”
    - i. The chair is, the chair is itself, the chair is what it is
    - ii. Consciousness is not, consciousness is not-itself, consciousness is not what it is
    - iii. Consciousness is a *lack* since it can never (fully) *be* what it is → temporality → freedom → anguish
  - g. Read carefully p.71/72
  - h. Remember: the being of consciousness is absolute; hence, S concludes that freedom is absolute; it cannot be derived from anything else than itself
  - i. S presents in the rest of the book a phenomenology of freedom that will always return to the “non-identity” of consciousness
    - i. Bad faith, transcendence, temporality, possibility, lack
    - ii. In this section he starts with anguish
  - j. So, what is interesting here is that S does not operate within the “normal” ways of addressing freedom: mind/brain, will/determinism, etc.; he wants to say that freedom characterizes human reality *as such*, and not just choices, acts, decisions, etc.; he cannot begin here, as all of these theories already presupposes a human being *in which* these other “things” (such as acts and wills) take place
  - k. “By this we must understand not a nihilating act, which would require in turn a foundation in Being, but an ontological characteristic of the Being required” (58)
  - l. According to S, *consciousness is not a thing*, it is pure difference and negation
  - m. Freedom (and its expression in anguish) is precisely the “non-identity” of consciousness; we can *never just be*, although we constantly try to do exactly this (bad faith)!
2. Where does Nothingness come from? (57)
  - a. Not from itself. Neither can being-in-itself be responsible for it.
  - b. Thus we need a being by which nothingness comes to things (57–58). (the for-itself.)

- c. “Furthermore — continuing our explication — he says that this special being must be one that is itself shot all through with nothingness — with absences, lacks, etc. If it weren’t, if it were purely positive, it would be just being-in-itself all over again. Hence it must be both. It cannot be mere nothingness; it has to be both a being and yet soaked all through with nothingness!” (from Spade, online)
  - d. So, although this is difficult to understand: the reality is, chairs are, numbers are; the universe is “full” and “positive.” So, how could it be that something *is not* there? Well, in the end, S argues, because there is one being in the universe (the for-itself, us) that is characterized by *is not* (it is constantly negating, even itself)
  - e. This “is not” S tries to first describe in terms such as questioning, distancing, etc.
3. The questioner can disconnect himself from the causal series (58), and this is what freedom is. (60) Freedom precedes human essence.
- a. Freedom cannot be a property of existence
  - b. Freedom is not a single act
  - c. Accordingly, human reality must be free (which is indicated already in the café scene because *everything* recedes into the background for Pierre to show up as not being there
4. Temporality
- a. S introduces the notion of freedom through time (63)
    - i. Although there is a continuity of consciousness, the present and the past are constantly negated which establishes a *distance* between past and present
    - ii. “the nothing that separates its present from all its past” (64)
    - iii. “consciousness continually experiences itself as the nihilation of its past being” (64)
    - iv. Temporality is non-identity
5. Anguish, distinguished from simple fear. (65–78); S will say more about anguish later; here he is only introducing the concept in order to find a *description of freedom that is not immediately object oriented*; instead freedom as anguish is about us as a whole
- a. Anguish is self-related (65)
  - b. Anguish is not to be confused with fear
  - c. Fear is object-related and to me as a thing
  - d. Anguish is the absolute openness and difference between *me now* and *my past/future*
  - e. “Anguish then is the pre-reflective apprehension of freedom by itself” (78)
6. Example: Vertigo (anguish in the face of the future)
- a. I am given to myself as a thing (objective possibilities, part of causal chain, etc.)
  - b. I escape fear by controlling myself as an object in the world
  - c. I am *in distance from the situation as a totality*, i.e., my conduct as a whole is a possibility of me (68) (think of the café example!!!)
  - d. “If nothing compels me to save my life, *nothing* prevents me from precipitating into the abyss” (69)
  - e. My overall conduct is only possible because my self is in the mode of not-being it (future)
7. Example: Gambler (anguish in the face of the past)

- a. “But what he apprehends then in anguish is precisely the total inefficacy of the past resolution” (70)
  - b. “I make myself *not to be* the past of good resolutions *which I am*” (70)
- 8. Psychological determinism, a flight from anguish. (78–85)
  - a. The attempt of make anguish the effect of something other than itself would turn ourselves again into something that is “itself” (without distance, break, negation, etc.)
  - b. Motives are not somehow “in” consciousness, as if consciousness is a “real” container; motives always – as everything – are an *object* of consciousness, i.e., they fall under intentionality
  - c. Motives are *for* someone motives
  - d. Consciousness negates itself and thereby becomes “a” transcendence (in this section already discussed as past and future) 71/72
  - e. Existence precedes essence (72); essence is the totality of someone’s past; however, as we know by now (gambler), anguish *separates* us from the totality of the past; so, we are never *identical* with our past, since in this case present and past would fall into one moment (and we would be dead)
  - f. Psychological determinism tries to reduce us to “never being anything but what we are” (79)
- 9. Action/values
  - a. Is pre-reflective
  - b. “Our being is immediately ‘in situation’; that is, it arises in enterprises and knows itself first in so far as it is reflected in those enterprises” (77)
  - c. I can put every act into question
  - d. With this distancing the past is revealed as *my* past and the future as *my* future (75)
  - e. In the moment in which I constitute the past as *my* past I turn it into a possibility of myself (79)
- 10. Freedom of the other
  - a. My own freedom is only limited by the freedom of the other
- 11. Upshot
  - a. (Self)Consciousness *distances* itself from the in-itself; we can only question the carburetor or judge that the house “is no longer” because we *are not* the motor or the house
  - b. The “distancing” (the non-identity) is not single acts; rather, we *are* distancing beings; our being *is* negation (including ourselves as beings); put differently, we *deny* the world its in-itself and we deny *us* as beings our in-itself
  - c. Remember, *since every act of consciousness is free for Sartre*, and since there is nothing unconscious about consciousness, we are constantly aware in whatever we do that we are acting freely (remember our discussion about the pre-reflective self-consciousness), with *nothing* to compel us and *nothing* to prevent us from doing whatever we choose.
  - d. We act as though we were not free, as though we were compelled. We try to find excuses, pass the blame, avoid our responsibility. We run away from anguish → bad faith (next chapter)
  - e. We are *as human reality* free AND we deceive ourselves as human reality

## ProfLotz, Phl421: Sartre, Bad Faith, Handout 4

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1. Falsehood
  - a. Consciousness is a “no;” its being = negating its being
  - b. If we *would be what we are* (in-itself), then bad faith, inauthenticity, and self-deception would not be possible (101)
  - c. Irony (87)
    - i. I say the opposite of what I mean
    - ii. The others know that I am ironic (truth)
  - d. Lying (87-89)
    - i. No problem: always related to others
    - ii. The lying person actually knows the truth; you try to deceive the other, but you are not deceived
  - e. Can you “lie” to yourself? (89-90)
    - i. Note: this is difficult for Sartre since he rejects psychoanalytic theory and since he argued in chapter one that consciousness is transparent in itself (so, ultimately that’s the reason why in section 3 of this chapter he starts talking about faith/knowledge)
    - ii. Problem: you lie to yourself, but how is this possible?
    - iii. The deceiver and the deceived are the same person
    - iv. The deceiver knows the truth, the deceived does not know the truth; so, how can this be possible in one person?
    - v. “Better yet I must know the truth very exactly *in order* to conceal it more carefully” (89)
    - vi. Important look forward: what S calls on p.90 “metastable”: people can “live in bad faith” (90), i.e., he already indicates that bad faith and self-deception about one’s freedom and being takes places on the level of pre-reflective *living through consciousness*
2. Critique of Freud (90-96; we jump over this passage)
3. Patterns (96)
  - a. Example: seduction
    - i. “We can see the use which bad faith can make of these judgements which all aim at establishing that I am not what I am. If I were only what I *am*, I could, for example, seriously consider an adverse criticism which someone makes of me, question myself scrupulously, and perhaps be compelled to recognize the truth in it” (99)
    - ii. Basic structure: transcendence-facticity (i.e., in bad faith I try to be a thing, like the woman’s hand in the seduction example); I deny that I am transcendence, i.e., that I am *always* in distance to what I am (99); I try to be a passive object (100)
    - iii. The woman in the seduction example tries to deny that she is a for-itself, a subject, she denies her freedom (of actually rejecting or affirming the seducer)
  - b. Example: waiter (101)
    - i. S observes something weird about the waiter

- ii. The waiter plays *being* a waiter; he follows an “obligation” (102) *to be* waiter
  - iii. Sure, he *is* a waiter, but, wait, he is *playing* waiter (because the waiter is not *just* a waiter, but many other things); he is playing a role
  - iv. He tries to give himself an *essence* (that’s what I am!)
  - v. He wants to be secure; he somehow negates that he was not always a waiter, that there are many other things going on and that he will not always *only* be a waiter; accordingly, *his essence is not fixed*
  - vi. We deny our freedom and try to be “just this or that” (facticity)
  - vii. Of course, S is talking about all of us: we are all like the waiter
  - viii. He surpasses his “being” a waiter → transcendence
4. Consciousness
- a. S goes back to what he was telling us in the preceding chapter
  - b. Consciousness “is not what it is” (111)
5. Sincerity
- a. Upshot: S argues that sincerity is basically the same as bad faith, for in the moment in which the sincere admits that he is evil (107) or a pederast (107), he already *denies* its being a pederast or evil, insofar as it is impossible to be only *this*.
6. Bad Faith
- a. It works! We all feel less anxious and more secure and “fixed” because we make ourselves a thing; we *believe* (that) are what we are
  - b. Bad faith is really S’s attempt to present a notion of *inauthenticity*
  - c. Here is the upshot of section 3 (you can get lost in what he says there...):
    - i. Remember: we are non-positionally/pre-reflectively conscious (of) what we are doing
    - ii. So, pre-reflective consciousness is *not* a form of knowledge (i.e., it is not reflective and it is not conceptual)
    - iii. Remember: knowledge emerges with a reflective act
    - iv. If consciousness is conscious (of) itself, then this “while” we are doing what we are doing, we *do not know that* we are doing it, i.e., we are in a mode of what might be called “faith” or “belief”
    - v. Accordingly, on the pre-reflective level we are always inauthentic because we do not know, i.e. *deny*, that we are doing it
    - vi. Now: apply this to the waiter: the waiter is pre-reflectively doing the waiter game. While the waiter *is* a waiter, he does not know that *he is not* a waiter (transcendence, role, etc.); so, here we go: while we are *in our acts* we necessarily *deny* our freedom because we try to be “just” one thing, namely, the current actualization of ourselves
    - vii. Similarly, I cannot *know that* I am courageous when I try to be courageous; so, I am *believing* it on the level of the act
    - viii. However, the *belief* (of) being courageous is *negated* by the translucency of consciousness itself, insofar as we are pre-reflectively conscious of our own believing; so, we cannot hide that we are *only* believing it, i.e., we do not know it!

- ix. We (the philosophers) and others always know about the bad faith/inauthenticity and can make at any time someone *aware of it*

## 7. Conclusion

- a. Though S starts out with lying and knowledge, this should really be read as an entry point since in the end he argues that bad faith/self-deception/inauthenticity (we are not what we are) is a necessary structure of the “not” of consciousness itself, and this is precisely *intuitive* [*Anschauung*] (instead of being propositional such as “I know that ‘x’)
- b. Good faith, sincerity, authenticity, is – as being – impossible, but it can be a “demand” (100), an “obligation” (101) and a “task” (105); so, does Sartre even rule out that we can have “authentic” moments? Check what he says on the impossibility of “full” sincerity on p.106
- c. Again, the point is that bad faith takes place on the level of non-reflective acts and acting
- d. Put differently, with every decision to do X or to be X you are inauthentic because you deny in this moment that this is only one possibility of many

## Phl 421: Sartre, ProfLotz, Handout 5: Immediate Structures of the For-Itself

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1. Where are we?
  - a. According to S I cannot coincide with myself = I am what I am not (I am the “not”)
    - i. I distinguish myself from *everything*; for S, there is nothing “in” consciousness, insofar as everything is a phenomenon
    - ii. The negation is *total*; the for-itself is a being (i.e., is part of the universe), but *as* being it *is not itself*
    - iii. The easiest way to understand this = the for-itself is nothing “fixed” (waiter); it is not a thing (fear), and it is not itself (negation, transcendence)
    - iv. Introduction of temporality = arguments against psychic determinism
      1. I am not my past
      2. I am not my future
      3. There is a difference between anguish (related to my freedom) and fear (related to me as facticity)
      4. Transcendence = I surpass all phenomena towards what I am not (my past and my future)
    - v. Freedom
      1. Must be total = human reality, i.e., is not a feature of single acts
      2. Willing acts and actions are possible actualizations of consciousness
      3. Here, again: I negate what is willed and what is to be reached in action
      4. Here: value (see below)
2. Presence to self
  - a. Starting point: cogito; however, it is wrong to determine it as substance (119)
  - b. Coincide = “being is what it is” (120)
  - c. Intentionality does not allow us to say that there simply *are* things around us or in consciousness; the pre-reflective “witness” (of) consciousness cannot mean that there is an absolute identity
  - d. Pre-reflective consciousness cannot be a second – reflective – act; only reflection implies dissociation (122)
  - e. Self-consciousness cannot be a *different* consciousness (infinite circle); reflection *alters* consciousness (and the reflection must itself be self-conscious)
  - f. The self cannot *be* self, it cannot coincide with itself
  - g. The self must be an *ideal* distance (self-relation); it negates its own coincidence and identity
  - h. The for-itself = presence to itself; distance without two in-itselfs; cannot be a relation between being and being
  - i. Consciousness exists as a “nihilation of identity” (125)
  - j. (Self)Consciousness = “absolute event” (126) → it is unfounded (127)
3. Facticity
  - a. Self-Consciousness cannot be its own foundation
    - i. There is no possibility “outside” of Self-Consciousness (129); possibility belongs to the for-itself
    - ii. Only *because* the for-itself is contingent can it desire to have a foundation (129)

- iii. The question of foundations is on the level of *value*
- iv. The nihilation of itself cannot be called a foundation since this act is *precisely* the act of denying all foundations; paradoxically: the cogito finds itself by *not* founding itself; I am *not* derived from or determined by something outside of myself *is* the foundation
- v. SelfConsciousness remains an absolute event (130); remember: I had already pointed to this thought in our first class sessions
- vi. The cogito is always *situational* (131); i.e., whatever I am by not being it (waiter) is given through my existential situation, i.e., *every* act is always characterized by transcending “something” (the now, the present, the given, etc.); so, it presupposes *a totality* negated in each moment; for example, I am my past by not being it; I am my future by not being it

#### 4. Value

- a. S discusses “value” for similar reasons to why he discussed past and future in the chapter on anguish
- b. The cogito can be described by a *lack*; lack introduces a specific relation between the non-coincidence of the self and its “attempt” to be itself;
- c. The best expression of this lacking nature of the self is *desire* (S goes here back to Plato and Hegel) (136)
  - i. Desire is not to be confused with conatus (which S interprets as material)
  - ii. Thirst does not exist on the level of physiology (it would then simply be a reconfiguration of the reality as itself)
  - iii. Thirst is not a *state*; rather, I *want to* drink
  - iv. In order to speak of “lack” something must *matter* for the self; it must be *for someone*; it must be consciousness of (138)
  - v. “The missing in=itself is pure absence” (138)
  - vi. The lack is the origin of transcendence; the cogito surpasses its facticity because it surpasses the given, the now, the limit, etc., *towards* what it lacks (139)
  - vii. Satisfaction = possible coincidence (i.e., for Sartre total satisfaction is *impossible*)
  - viii. The for-itself is “unhappy consciousness” (140), here: Hegel, since it *wants to* be itself, but it can only be itself as for-itself, i.e., by not being itself; uuuh... super sad, isn’t it?
  - ix. The unreachable totality, or, better, the impossibility of coinciding with itself, makes the totality a lack and gives it an implicit “norm” (aha! = value)
  - x. Example: suffering (142)
  - xi. Value is another expression for the lack of foundation; value cannot exist, it is beyond being; it *is* only insofar as it is desired
  - xii.

#### 5. Possibility

# Phl 421: Sartre, ProfLotz, Handout 6: Temporality

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## 1. Again

- a. Value: "The particularity of this project is what gives rise to different values. For the waiter, things take on value precisely in the light of his project to be a particular kind of waiter, to be a particular kind of waiter-God. Everything is evaluated in terms of that goal, the impossible, ideal goal. Everything is evaluated in terms of, measured against, the particular kind of God the waiter is trying to be." (from Spade, online)
- b. It seems as if S argues that authenticity (*be a waiter*, but do not run away from your freedom) is *higher* than inauthenticity. However, he does not present an ethics implied (for this, see the later *Notebook on Ethics*)
- c. S seems to argue that there is an ontological necessity for the primacy of authenticity because the for-itself is characterized by *lack* (is not what it is) and the necessity to *be* lack (to actualize your existence as lack); lack, however, presupposes that that which one lacks (being) is posited as better and *desired* (=value)

## 2. Temporality

- a. The three moments of time should not be conceived as a series of given nows, of which some are no longer and some are not yet
- b. S argues against
  - i. "Presentists" = those who implicitly argue that there is only the present (sensationalists); the past exists in memory, memory is a present act, hence the past is present (160)
  - ii. "objectivists" = those who argue that the past has a "kind of honorary existence" (161); the event "keeps" its being; the past is as the present; here, again, there is no real past and we can't explain that the past is "no longer" and that I am *not* my past (so, here, again, S prepares his viewpoint via negation), and we can't explain how the past can be *for us* (162)
- c. Past
  - i. So, the past "must be for us as non-being" (162)
    1. The "no longer" cannot be the result of being (we know this from the former chapters); so, the past must be constituted via not-being; if this would not be the case that we would *be* in some kind of "eternal now"
    2. The past can also not just "be," as Bergson seems to claim, for the past must belong to someone; it is *my past*, i.e., it cannot be thought of as something independent from (self)consciousness
    3. As a consequence, time is for S not some kind of container; rather, time must *first* be someone's past (or future), and *then* constituted as something objective in which everything participates (165)
  - ii. Now, "having" a past cannot mean that the past is an objective property of someone or something external to the for-itself (166)
    1. The past cannot be something "passive" (167)

2. The for-itself *has to be its past* (you have to acknowledge it, struggle with it, reject it, relate yourself to it, etc.); we constantly change the *meaning* of the past (170)
  3. So, S treats the past like any other phenomenon; it is intentional, it is a phenomenon, but it emerges as something that “no longer” exist; it can only emerge *for* consciousness
  4. I cannot disconnect myself from my past; I am my past (168)
  5. Death = I am *entirely* past; I no longer have a relation to it; I am myself
  6. S argues similar to how he argues about nothingness: the past cannot be a creation of the subject (or a representation); it cannot be *in* consciousness; however, it can also not be discovered without the for-itself (170)
  7. A past not known by anyone is not really a past (for example, we could not say that something is *no longer*); there would only be a reconfiguration of the itself
- iii. “if I am not what I was, it is not because I have already changed, which would suppose a time already given, but because I am related to my being in the mode of an internal bond of non-being” (172)
  - iv. The past is the *facticity* that I transcend towards the future
- d. Let’s jump over the “presence”
- e. Future
- i. S starts in the same way as he had argued about the past: the future cannot be a *present representation* of the self (he argues against the entire tradition of subjectivist positions)
  - ii. We *exist* our future
  - iii. Remember: the for-itself is “pre-judicative relation of itself to itself” (180); therefore the future primarily cannot be some kind of representative act (imagination, etc.)
  - iv. Example: tennis court (future is part of pre-reflective action, it is embodied) (181)
  - v. The future is not another now that is not yet (182)
  - vi. “The future is *what I have to be* in so far as I can not be it” (182)
  - vii. Remember: the for-itself is a *lack*; so, the future is that which makes my present *meaningful*
  - viii. As we have seen in the last chapter, the for-itself transcends itself towards the future (possible/impossible identity, value); here, S introduces the concept of project; the for-itself projects itself towards itself *as* not being

## Phl 421: Sartre, Fall 2017, Handout 7: Knowledge and The Problem of Others

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1. S gives a good summary of what was going on in chapter one on pp.238-239
2. Note how he uses *responsibility* on p.239: “it produces itself originally on the foundation of a relation to the in-itself,” i.e., since the for-itself cannot totally merge with the it-self and since it cannot coincide with itself, it founds itself as not-being founded, and this S calls “responsibility.” Whenever we run away from our responsibility, we try to become a thing again, i.e., we try to found ourselves in an *external* being; but, given the basic negative quality of self-consciousness, we will always fail (unless we die)
3. Intuition
  - a. S uses this term in a philosophical way; it means: non-abstract, non-universal, non-“empty”
  - b. S claims, following Husserl, that all abstract forms of “knowledge” (arguments, deductions, proofs, etc.) ultimately are based on intuitive knowledge
  - c. Intuition is immediate (247); however, as S points out, the immediacy cannot mean that knower and known “merge”
4. Intentionality
  - a. This section is very helpful for understanding the core of BN; a lot of what he says here should be somehow familiar by now
    - i. To speak about knowledge presupposes that we have knowledge *of* something; however, the condition of this relation is consciousness itself as consciousness *of* something
    - ii. The object (of x) presupposes a negation; I can only be related to a phenomenon if I am *not* it; I am not the chair, I am not the number, etc.; so, as S points out, it is misleading to say that the thing is not being consciousness (242)
5. Knowledge
  - a. “Knowledge appears as a mode of being” (242). What S wants to say is that knowledge cannot be a separate “something” *in* consciousness; instead, it must be a/the mode of consciousness itself
  - b. S excluded empirical knowledge from his considerations (i.e., stuff I know via learning and experience); he is concerned with knowledge as it belongs to the being of the for-itself; knowledge as an “ontological relation” (244)
  - c. In order to know a particular object, I have the relationship to *this* object *already* established (or: knowledge about presupposes knowledge of)
  - d. Again: an internal negation is presupposed for having a “knowledge” relation to an object (245)
  - e. The real object of knowledge is not simply an object; instead, it is *the known*; however, there is *nothing* that separates the knower from the known (247)
  - f. The known must be known *in presence* (i.e., it cannot be mediated by a third, it cannot be reflective, i.e., the act itself must be *intuitive*)
  - g. Since the for-itself is itself nothing, knowledge is simply the pure presence of an object, i.e., it is identical with “phenomenon,” it is one realization of the for-itself; i.e., knowledge cannot be a representation (image, p.314)

## 6. Others

- a. S now expands his analysis of the for-itself towards the existence of others; he rejects former attempts to grasp the existence of others; however, he agrees with phenomenologists such as Husserl and Heidegger that intersubjectivity is totally misunderstood if reduced to the question of “other minds” or the problem of solipsism
- b. Carefully think about the example of shame with which S opens part 3 of BN: shame is described as a mode of *having to be*, not of abstract knowledge; shame is not “in” you; you are ashamed of yourself; in addition, it is immediately a relation to the other; the other seems to be somehow “inscribed” into the for-itself and my relation to myself (302); it is not discursive or based on some kind of thought deduction
- c. The way in which we are *for-others* must have something to do with our embodiment; this embodiment, as S will later demonstrate, does not equal mind-thing + body-thing
  - i. Realists: they do understand that the body is central; however, they conceive the body as an it-self, as a thing in the world that does not differ from other things such as chairs and tables; realists do not deny the existence of the other; however, they then reduce everything to the problem of knowledge (305)
    1. Indication
    2. Empathy
  - ii. Idealists: they have the problem of how to connect the *universal* knowledge of the other (noumenal) to the concrete experience; The other shows up as an organized totality (307); the *ideal* unification (308) cannot be applied to experience, we do not understand in the Kantian horizon how we can live in “different” temporal experiences; the idealists either end up in solipsism or in some kind of mysticism
    1. Causality
    2. As if (regulative idea)
  - iii. The main problem of both realism and idealism is that they establish the difference between others as *external* negations (differences between things) (312); the negation is turned into something given (for S it has to be “established”); every external negation requires a “witness” who posits and “observes” the difference (so, it ends up in infinite circles again) (313): S had said more about external negations in the section on knowledge
- d. “I am the one who constitutes the Other in the field of his experience” (314); think about this carefully; S tries to think the relation to the Other as a kind of double negation; I can experience myself as a thing and it-self since the other negates my self-presence and my for-itself, Flynn calls this the “looking/looked-at model of interpersonal relations” (205)
- e. Ultimately, the other produces a pre-reflective self-consciousness of that which I transcend (it-self, thing); S terms this “being-for-others” (analysis in “The Look”)

# Phl 421: Sartre, ProfLotz, Handout 8: Freedom, part I

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1. Right at the beginning S makes clear that he is not interested in the classical problem of determinism and free will (559); so, he tries to shift the entire framework of how to think about freedom and action towards his own ontology; the entire section is one of the most powerful in BN, and less difficult to apprehend: "the will is not a privileged manifestation of freedom (...), and which is supported (...) by an original, ontological freedom" (583)
2. Action
  - a. Intentionality, i.e., consciousness *of* action; consequences belong to the order of causes, not intentions
  - b. The *being* of an agent cannot be the *motive* of an act; in fact, this must be negated in order to establish an act; "factual states" are *never*, S argues, motives
    - i. Position of a *future* ideal state ("value", end, goal, etc.), "what is not"
    - ii. Negation of the current state
    - iii. Consequence: it is never the past as such that can bring about an act
  - c. First step of S's argument: freedom must be related to the *end* of the act (563); i.e. that which causes an act is a *negatite* (future is not)
  - d. Transcendence is the condition of an act; so, notice how S moves away from thinking about action as some kind of "thing" released by a will
  - e. An act is a synthesis of motive, intention, act, and end; the motive is an "integral part of the act" (565)
  - f. Important: "Cause, act, and end constitute a *continuum*, a *plenum*" (568)
  - g. Freedom must be related to the *entirety* of human reality since every act (as a synthesis) belongs to the for-itself *as a whole*; "Man cannot be sometimes slave and sometimes free; he is wholly and forever free or he is not free at all" (569)
3. Freedom
  - a. Freedom cannot be an essence; instead, it is the *absolute condition* of the for-itself
  - b. "My freedom is perpetually in question in my being, it is not a quality added on or a *property* of my nature" (566), i.e., freedom belongs to human reality as such, it belongs to *all* actualizations of my being; "all my 'modes of being' manifest freedom equally since they are all ways of being my own nothingness" (574)
  - c. Psychic determinism posits the motive as *givens* "in" us; as we know by now, S rejects this idea of a "full identity" ("everything is full" 567); I *am* always what I *am not*; "Human-reality is free because it *is not enough*" (568)
  - d. Psychology takes motives as *things* (568); so, it is a form of bad faith
  - e. Note: S is not arguing that we have full "control" of every act; freedom is its own limit; however, even if we have, say, mental health issues or find ourselves in an ICU unit, we are still conscious of it and can struggle with it; freedom, for S, is not on the level of single acts [here, Marcuse will step in]
4. Will
  - a. S discusses this in relation to the passions; by now it should be clear that the will is not the central focus of S's concept of freedom; Freedom "cannot be limited to voluntary acts" (572)

- b. The will/passions model presupposes that there is something in us that we have control of and something else that escapes us; i.e., will is only possible if there is something beyond the will; this conflicts with S's point that either human reality is free or it is not
  - c. Central: "the will, far from being the unique or at least the privileged manifestation of freedom, actually – like every event of the for-itself – must presuppose the foundation of an original freedom in order to be able to constitute itself as will" (571)
  - d. The will/passion approach to freedom posits an *external* cause *in* consciousness, which is, according to S's position, contradictory
  - e. Remember: S does not deny that we *are situational* beings; he is not arguing that we can do whatever we want; we freely exist our bodies, but this belongs to facticity
  - f. Passions are *projects*; i.e., they are actualizations of our being, and, hence, fall under the transcendence/future/end structure; passions cannot be in us like heart and brain; we *are* our passions; i.e., we actualize our freedom *as* passionate beings
  - g. Example: even if run away because I am afraid of dying, this "being in fear" presupposes a transcendence through which I posit the future, i.e., my future life, as *positive*; so, my being taken over by fear and my running away presuppose a negatite, which in this case is the *positive* value of life; this value is *posited* and cannot be derived from nature
  - h. So, "the will is determined within the compass of motives and ends already posited by the for-itself in a transcendent projection of itself toward its possibles" (573)
5. Cause, motive, end
- a. S now comes to the central point, namely, that the *end* is the *absolute condition* of every act and, accordingly, freedom is the condition of both cause and motive
  - b. "the cause, far from determining the action, appears only in and through the project of an action" (578); causes (=external, objective, conditions) are *discovered* through positing ends
  - c. Once a cause is discovered in the light of an end, it turns into a *motive*, i.e., something "in us" that causes us to act; i.e., we turn it into something *past*, 579, and therefore I make it *mine*; however, as S argues, the motive still depends upon the free positing of an end; so, causes and motives have to become *my* motive and they can only become *my* motive since I transcend them towards my end (which is absolute and cannot be derived from nature)
  - d. S argues that the concept of freedom has nothing to do with the concept of deliberation, insofar as every deliberation already *presupposes* a projection of values; even if it is the *project of deliberation* itself
6. Existential psychoanalysis
- a. All projects need to go back to an "original project" (588)

## Phl 421: Sartre, ProfLotz, Handout 9: Freedom 2

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1. Freud
  - a. S points out that Freud also analyzes acts within a broader structure; however, F's theory is "vertical determinism" (what S has in mind is that a psychic surface is determined by something "deeper") (590)
  - b. The underlying structure is traced back to the past in F
  - c. F does not allow for "preontological comprehension of the meaning of his acts" (591); i.e., he does not have a proper theory of the pre-reflexive cogito; the meaning of acts and its underlying causes are only visible for a third person (the therapist)
  - d. So, S proposes to let F's theory go and to focus on method (591)
2. Method
  - a. S underlines that F is better than most psychic determinisms, since he does not interpret acts as the effects of other psychic states
  - b. Example: certain acts can be made comprehensible as being based on the "inferiority complex;" however, S. points out that I have to *be* my inferiority complex, and, as such, it is subject to S's theory of transcendence; I choose my complex by affirming it or by giving in to it
  - c. S proposes to think about "comprehensibility" in a different way: a) by a regressive psychoanalysis that traces the present mode of being back to some kind of "ultimate possible" and then, towards the future, its "integration in the total form" (592); S prepares here his idea that ultimately all projects can be traced back to "meta"-projects and "original choices" that constitute both myself and the world as a totality
  - d. My world and my mode of being myself always display my choice, insofar as I cannot not be and need to take over and "affirm" my own being
  - e.

## Phl 421: Sartre, ProfLotz, Handout 10: Critical Points from the French Marxist Left

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1. Specific points, BN
  - a. Sartre's concept of situation is important for the social-political reception of the book, as it defies the criticism that Sartre thinks about freedom only in relation to isolated individuals; in fact, according to S, we can only be free if we are *limited*; freedom is a relation to the *given*
  - b. However, although his philosophy *tends* towards a concept of freedom as *practical* liberation, he does not take this step; reason for this failure = if we are *ontologically* free, why then do we have the need to *become* free?
  - c. Existentialism shares therefore with Marxism the concern for the everyday situation of human beings; we are in the world
  - d. All examples of being-with-others are bourgeois examples
  - e. His concept of being-with-others does not offer any space of thinking about social organizations and social institutions
  - f. The *historical* essence of social relations is absent
  - g. Sartre's concept of "having" and possessions remains bourgeois; he remains anthropological; he does not see the historical specificity of property relations; i.e., in this case of capitalism
  - h. His concept of money is inappropriate
  - i. The concept of anxiety seems to echo the "crisis" of our times; so, to celebrate it as something positive remains ideological
2. General after publication
  - a. Communist paper *Action* launched a critique of S, it was vicious; his philosophy was displayed as anti-worker, anti-revolutionary, anti-political, etc.; his philosophy displays individualism and is the enemy of the working class
  - b. S tried to defend himself, but in all cases was again criticized; so, as a consequence, he moved away from the French CP; overall, his philosophy was also a contender for the official CP doctrine, insofar as he focused on action, practice, engagement, etc.; so, S's philosophy could not *simply* be dismissed as a bourgeois contemplative philosophy
  - c. Mougins: rejection of Sartre's concept of subjectivity; however, this led again to a travesty of Marxist determinism
  - d. Lukacs: S was not too far away from Lukacs who also developed in HCC a new way of thinking about history as active, ethical, and political engagement; Lukacs mainly criticizes the focus on the individual, but he does notice the practical core of Sartre's philosophy; S does not have a concept of history, of historical agents, and of historical change
  - e. Lefebvre: S does not see the collective relation to nature, i.e., the economic organization of society; this gets lost in S's concept of consciousness; Sartre only

offers a “pseudo-solution” of freedom, insofar as he has no collective and no political concept of freedom; Lefebvre: S speaks for the “decadent class”

- f. Merleau-Ponty: you read it
3. Response
- a. Sartre wrote tons of essays in which he criticized orthodox Marxist for being unable to develop a concept of revolutionary subjectivity
  - b. The article *Materialism and Revolution* is a good example for this critique, but he again fails to address the problem of history; this article and other can be read as a critique of the doctrine of the CP, which S accuses of choking the worker’s freedom in mythical doctrines and bureaucratic apparatuses
  - c. This is also the main reason why S was the main philosopher in Europe who developed a deep relation with anti-colonialism and, through the Vietnam war, imperialism
  - d. For a while S participated in a resistance group organized by the CP, *Rassemblement Democratique Revolutionnaire*, and moved even towards integrating the concept of alienation into his own thinking (=“humanist Marxism”), but his engagement failed and he moved away from the CP (until the mid 50s)
  - e. Ultimately, S develops in CDR a new phenomenology of groups and of class consciousness that can survive within a structural concept of history

## Phl 421: Sartre, ProfLotz, Handout 11: Notes on *Materialism and Revolution*, 1947

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### 1. Materialism

- a. Dialectical materialism positions itself against metaphysics; however, S wonders how one can make basic assumptions about the relation between spirit and matter without the inclusion of metaphysics (162)
- b. Engels tries to eliminate subjectivity in his philosophy of nature. S argues that Engels turns subjects into objects without properly reflecting on the process through which he turns himself into the objective *eye* (163); remember: intentionality is absolute for S
- c. Experience is always first; for example, temperature is *first* a phenomenon of the for-itself before it can be grasped as quantity (164)
- d. If it is true that dialectical materialism presupposes that the real is rational (i.e., follows dialectical development), where does it get its *certitude*, i.e., something subjective, from; given that materialism eliminates the for-itself; it can only work with scientific probabilities
- e. Materialism can argue that consciousness is an effect of a material cause, but the relation between thought and object is not causal, thought “expresses” the object; i.e., intentionality is absolute, causality is itself a phenomenon (162)
- f. The causality that the materialist operates with does not lead to any totalities; the effect cannot contain more than what is in the cause; however, dialectical materialism operates with totalities (the whole, process, “the” society, “the” history, etc.); in addition, totalities are presupposed in the idea of evolutionary or historical progression (165)
- g. Marx begins with the “richest notion” (the whole, the concrete), but science begins with the most abstract notion (laws, principles, etc.), science cannot develop a theory that shows that the parts are *contained* in the whole
- h. Dogmatic Marxists want to believe in science, but reject all principles on which good science is built upon, such as reflection, critique, skepticism, anti-dogmatism, anti-authority) (167) [this is a critique of soviet style dogmatic Marxism in France]
- i. **Most importantly, materialism cannot explain the constitution of “revolutionary class consciousness” (171), i.e., Sartre argues that his theory of the for-itself is needed for explaining the *consciousness of the oppressed class of itself* (170); “Never will a state of the world produce a consciousness of class” → that’s why we need revolutionaries, that’s why we need political and historical agents; materialism cannot explain the premise of its own theory, namely that the working class will overturn the state of affairs; there is a rupture, freedom, that we need to take into account; Sartre argues that without the constitution of the *class as an agent*, which cannot be explained by cause and effect, the present condition cannot be overcome; S argues from now on for the primacy of political action, philosophy has to be politically engaged**

### 2. Materialism as a weapon

- a. Given all these problems, in particular the attempt of materialists to eliminate subjectivity, S proposes to use materialism *pragmatically*, i.e. as a social weapon to battle idealisms. Since idealism is taken as a doctrine of the dominating class, materialism

becomes the ideological weapon of the oppressed class (166); in fact, Marx proposes something like this in his early writings

- i. "In the struggle against that state of affairs, criticism is no passion of the head, it is the head of passion. It is not a lancet, it is a weapon. Its object is its *enemy*, which it wants not to refute but to *destroy*. [...] Criticism does not need to make things clear to itself as regards this object, for it has already settled accounts with it. It no longer assumes the quality of an *end-in-itself*, but only of a *means*. Its essential pathos is *indignation*, its essential work is *denunciation*." (Marx, Contributions to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Introduction)
  - b. As history shows, materialism was always the doctrine of revolutionary attitudes (S mentions Epicurus)
3. The revolutionary
- a. Revolution = profound change of property relations (unfortunately S does not say much more about this, as it could have lead him to say more about the constitution of society...) (167); here again, S does not pay much attention to structures of society constituted by social-economic categories
  - b. The revolutionary speaks to a *particular* class, although his position is *universal*; the ruling class speaks to the entire society, although his social position is *particular*
  - c. The revolutionary wants the destruction of the oppressing class; she is not an insurgent (168)
    - i. Transcendence of situation towards the future
    - ii. Comprehends history as a totality
    - iii. Is the historic agent
    - iv. Realizes the present from the standpoint of a future humanity
    - v. Standpoint of labor
    - vi. Revolutionary solidarity
    - vii. Thought = action
  - d. The ideology of the ruling class is based on the premise (168)
    - i. that one is on earth by divine right (unquestioned, everything is "there" for them)
    - ii. that one has the right to exist
    - iii. that the world is made for them
    - iv. that they command
  - e. The position of the working class is based on the premise (169)
    - i. that it receives its existence via the ruling class
    - ii. that one needs to struggle for existence
    - iii. that one does not have the right to exist (hence struggle)
    - iv. that there is no "divine" place in society for it
    - v. that the privileges of the ruling class need to be destroyed
    - vi. that the rights that the ruling class as invented need to be destroyed
    - vii. that values that are declared to be universal by the ruling class are in truth only particular and instruments of oppression (170)
  - f. The revolutionary speaks
    - i. For the entire class
    - ii. From the standpoint of humanity

4. Revolutionary philosophy shows that
  - a. Human beings are contingent (no divine right, no aristocracy, no natural claim to govern, etc.)
  - b. Collectively established orders can be overcome
  - c. That the current values, even if declared as universal values, reflect the particular social position of the ruling class
  - d. Can only disclose itself to the oppressed (172)
5. Conclusions
  - a. “Revolutionary man must be a contingent being [here EXISTENTIALISM], unjustifiable but free, entirely immersed in the society that oppresses him [here MARXISM], but capable of transcending this society by his efforts to change it. Idealism [RULING CLASS] mystifies him in that it binds him by rights and values that are already given; it conceals from him his power to devise roads of his own. But materialism also mystifies him, by depriving him of his freedom. The revolutionary philosophy [EXISTENTIAL MARXISM] must be a philosophy of transcendence” (170)
  - b. **Here is S’s blow: contemporary Marxism is dogmatic, mechanistic, fears freedom and risk, smuggles in a priori knowledge where there is none, and reduces history to a developing idea [i.e., S. argues that it falls back onto Hegelian idealism] (171); for Sartre, without freedom “the triumph of socialism is not assured at all” (172)**
  - c. Surprising overall point 1: without a philosophy of freedom (which the Marxist take to be a form of idealism) Marxism is a form of idealism!
  - d. Surprising overall point 2: though S states that the CP is the only revolutionary party, he criticizes the party of having no revolutionary philosophy, i.e., they need to sober up and include existentialism as a philosophy of freedom into their doctrine...
6. Looking forward
  - a. In chapter one of *Search for a Method* S unleashes a similar critique: contemporary Marxism in France (around 1955) “stopped” (21) to be a “living Marxism” (26) and fell back on dogmatic presentations of a “truth a priori” (27) and “scholasticism” (28); the main problem, S argues, is that in the official versions “history is made without self-awareness” (29) [Uhhh... here we go] and that, as he says with Marx, “men themselves [...] make their history” (31); so, Sartre – in line with other so called “Western” Marxists, such as the Frankfurt School philosophers – [a] positions Marx *against* party line Marxism and “doctrines,” and [b], argues for a new political doctrine.