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





Research Portfolio

Updated: 1/10/2018

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Book Covers



Research Areas and Research Projects

Area I: Critical Theory, Marx, Theory of Society

1: Phenomenology of Social Categories (book project, 2020)

In some of my more recent work, I argued that we need to broaden and renew critical theory of society by framing it with a contemporary version of a Marx-inspired critique of political economy that should neither be misunderstood as a “world view politics” nor be reduced to a “labor theory of value,” which, not incidentally, is a term that Marx never uses. It is in this sense that I am in agreement with more recent social theorizing in Germany, Italy, and France that is referred to as *value form theory*, which has established Marx as a serious interlocutor for developing a contemporary theory of society. In my mind, any dismissal of a social-economic theory of society has consequences for a philosophical conception of contemporary social organization as a whole. As I argue, the turn of recent Frankfurt School thinkers to ethical and normative questions lead to the loss of a sufficient concept of society in general and capitalist social organization in particular, as the reduction of the concept of “society” *as a totality* that exists “behind the back of agents” to normative social relations *between* these agents leads to a loss of a *critical* conception of contemporary society. It is important to note that critique in Marx, who follows Kant in this regard, means to demonstrate that the object in question, i.e., capitalist social organization, is limited and finite. This also means that “critique” here does not mean something ethical; instead, it is meant as a specific way of analyzing and accessing this reality (as in Kant’s *Critique of Purer Reason*). I should also underline that I do not reduce Marx to an economist or anthropologist; rather, I think that he offers us a profound way of doing social theory, and I follow critical theorists, such as Adorno, in their claim that we have no immediate access to this whole by means of empirical research or positivist approaches to social reality; instead, we are in need of a *theory* of social reality, as the task of theory is to reconstruct and present the whole beyond what is empirically accessible. Accordingly, I still believe (in contrast to some proponents in contemporary social theory) that we have no *direct* access to social reality “as such” and, consequently, that we need a theory of knowledge *and* a social ontology that informs us about how we can know this society as well as about what it *is*. Accordingly, my starting point is a transformed Kantian position, broadly defined, which

assumes that we cannot develop a contemporary theory of society if we do not find a way of combining [1] classical epistemology (i.e., what does it mean to know society), [2] social ontology (i.e., what is the being or form of society), and [3] a critique of political economy (i.e., what does it mean to be in *this* society). In my project I intend to spell these questions out by using methodological positions developed in early critical theory (such as Adorno and Lukacs), classical phenomenology (such as Husserl and Heidegger), and a renewed theory of Marx's critique of political economy (on the basis of the "New Marx Reading" mentioned above). All of this should lead to a contemporary social ontology that corrects the normative and anti-epistemological tendencies in recent critical theory.

As a matter of fact, the main figures in contemporary critical theory have dismissed attempts to base its theories of society on social ontology, and, instead, refer to communicative action (Habermas), recognition (Honneth), normativity in general (Benhabib, Forst), power (Allen) or gender conceptions of society (Fraser). Accordingly, one might be skeptical about my claim that we would do well to develop further a Marxian-inspired social theory and push critical theory into different directions than what its main proponents are arguing for. However, despite the stubborn reluctance of critical theorists to turn their attention to questions of how contemporary capitalism and neoliberalism operate and how we can better understand them with a revised version of Marx's critique of political economy, the last decades have seen major developments in contemporary materialist approaches in almost any other field but philosophy, which means that I am not a lonesome caller in the desert. For example, [1] David Harvey's critical geography has shifted the entire research in his field towards a Marxian-inspired methodology, [2] supply chain theory and theories of logistics have found increasing interest by scholars in the social sciences, [3] almost the entire field of globalization studies and post-colonial theory is in one way or another influenced by critical materialist approaches to society and economy, [4] most critical analyses of neoliberalism go back to the materialist concepts of society, and even [5] historians, such as Sven Beckert, who are not well known for their allegiance to the Marxist tradition, return to insights that were already formulated by Marx-inspired scholars decades before. The only major exception in this interdisciplinary return to materialist theory of society is contemporary social-political philosophy, both in its Anglo-American liberal variants stemming from Rawls, as well as in its European variants stemming from Habermas. This situation is even more astonishing if we take into account that philosophy, at least in my conception of it, should develop creative ideas, tools and concepts that would, in

turn, also be of value for other disciplines. However, the narrow focus on normative questions alone has made this move difficult.

One reason for this lack in contemporary social-political philosophy can be seen in the lack of reflection on the origins and early developments of the Frankfurt School and critical theory in Europe at the beginning of the 20th Century, which was characterized by an intense confrontation of all major schools of thought, which, in one way or another, still influence major ways of philosophizing, such as Neo-Kantianism, classical sociological theory (such as Durkheim and Weber), phenomenology, analytic philosophy, structuralist anthropology, and phenomenology. With a few exceptions, most contemporary critical theorists in the Anglo-American context underestimate the fact that the crucial early period of critical theory, i.e., during the formulation of its goals and main principles, critical theory and the Frankfurt School (such as Marcuse, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Fromm) cannot be understood without the inclusion of phenomenology and Neo-Kantianism. Although the connections between Adorno and phenomenology as well as between Marcuse and phenomenology are well known, contemporary debates in critical theory are rarely engaged with the rich historical context that gave critical theory a roadmap for combining epistemology and social ontology. My project will propose corrections to this development.

In more detail, the main question that was driving these schools is *precisely* the question of the connection of the philosophical tasks to contemporary social contexts and problems, which requires developing a theory of society (social ontology) on the basis of a theory of social knowledge (social epistemology). Put differently, this is the question of how a subjective epistemology à la Kant can be turned into an explicit social project. The main two figures that are crucial in this context are Lukacs and Heidegger, as both philosophers had the same ideas at the starting point of their philosophical developments: Lukacs' position can be seen in the attempt to turn Kantian epistemology into social theory and Heidegger's position is based on the claim that Kant's philosophy of the subject can be turned into a phenomenology of human existence.

The contemporary lack of a philosophical account of social knowledge in connection with a theory of contemporary capitalism is also visible in the lack of engagement with Lukacs' theory of society beyond his famous theory of reification. This dismissal and blindness in contemporary critical theory is especially astonishing if we take into account that Lukacs' lifelong project had been the development of a new social ontology that is based on the attempt not only to

translate epistemological concepts into social-ontological concepts, but also to transform the Kantian epistemological background into social ontology and a Marxian framework. My project aims at renewing this move and pushing it forward critically.

It seems to me that Lukács' concepts of what a "social object" is and what can be properly conceived as the object of social knowledge need to be connected not only to Marx's *Capital*, but also to a strong concept of category by which a critique of political economy in the Marxian sense is characterized. This is not only important for Lukács, but also, as a short look into the intellectual network in European philosophy at the beginning of the 20th Century reveals, for all prominent schools, insofar as the question of how to understand the concept of category is central for their attempts to escape metaphysics. For example, phenomenologists ranging from Husserl to Heidegger were concerned with a reinterpretation of the concept of categories, insofar as these thinkers try to rescue it from what they conceive as its subjective background in Kant. On the one hand, we find attempts to re-interpret categories as something that transcend the positioning of the transcendental subject as something that is somehow given in life (Lask), but on the other hand, we find attempts to turn categories into units of meaning [*Sinn*] and "regional" frames (Husserl); and, finally, we also find the attempt to re-interpret categories through a hermeneutic lens, such as in Heidegger, who transforms "categories" into what he famously calls "existentialia" in *Being and Time*. Existentialia are basic interpretive schemas through which human existence interprets itself and, hence, becomes *known* to itself. In this model, being and knowledge are intimately intertwined, and, as such, I intend to use Heidegger's ideas for social philosophy (which he denied for reasons that go beyond the scope of this application). Heidegger's early work focuses on the problem of categories as *both* an epistemological *and* ontological task. Categories are introduced as the most basic elements to interpreting the *frame* of what is experienceable and accessible, which leads Heidegger to develop a phenomenological approach to the problem of categories as something that has to be "wrested from the phenomena" and cannot be simply found in knowledge (subject) or reality (society). Heidegger argues that categories of life can neither be deduced from an external subjective standpoint nor be analyzed as a "metaphysical" given. Instead, categories need to be "read off" from where they emerge. I will use this phenomenological method and apply it to the problems of a theory of society, by arguing that the basic concepts (i.e., categories) of a theory of capitalist society can neither be found in knowledge alone nor be found "out there." This Heideggerian approach to categories as the most basic concepts of reality is of crucial

importance for my project since I argue that a proper contemporary version of how phenomenologists arrive at basic concepts can overcome both the subjectivist and the objectivist traditions in critical theory, as well as attempts in classical sociology, such as in Durkheim and Simmel, to deal with the problem of categories from a social point of view.

Accordingly, further developing a theory of social categories is important for the following reasons: we should reject a transcendental theory of categories (Kant) that ties them to the structure of subjective reason, and, on the other hand – and of equally importance – we should reject a metaphysical theory of categories (Hegel) that ties them to the structure of objective reason and to being. In my estimation, Marx's critical theory of society offers us such a theory of society as a *relation* that is constituted as something that exists *genuinely* between "being" and subjective construction. This genuine theory of the social as the "third" realm between subject and object as well as between mind and matter, in connection with the question of how we have access to the object "capitalist society," is the true core of Marx's *Capital*, and removing this methodological aspect leads to a reduction of Marxism either to sociology and empirical research or to a falsely understood naturalism.

Capitalist social form, i.e., that which makes society a *capitalist* (and not another form of) society, in my view, is an *object of theoretical knowledge* and cannot, as, for example, Habermas claims, be reconstructed through what he calls the perspective of participants. Against this, I submit that we need a *theory* of society given that the object of this theory is not given, immediately accessible, or revealed in "facts," statistics, empirical data, or the knowledge of social agents. Put differently, what *kind of* society we live in can only be reconstructed through a theory of the whole and its historically specific social form. This social form, however, is not universal; instead, it is a *specific* form and, accordingly, it needs to be reconstructed as a *specific* society. Humans, as Marx argues, do not live in "societies as such;" instead, we live in societies that are characterized through a specific network of "categories" or *basic social relations* that constitute the whole and totality of this *specific* social form. Thus, social categories and a theory of social categories are crucial for any claim about the *being* of this society. In fact, as I argue, if we give up the abstraction "society as such," we are necessarily forced to assume that the *specific form* of a society is constituted as a whole and totality. The concept of "unity," however, is unthinkable without at least implicitly referring to those concepts that constitute and make up this unity *as a* unity. Social categories, as I submit, are only thinkable as the constitutive moments of such a unity, and, seen as a whole, allow us to speak of a "social form." As I argue,

developing such a concept of social form is decisive, especially since many theories in the social sciences and in economics either operate on the basis of abstractions, such as “the” society, “the” laws, “the” principles, “the” market, “the” utilitarian agent, “the” exchange logic, etc., or fall back on a-theoretical empirical research alone. In other words, there is a tendency to *naturalize* the premises of our own social models and theories. The task, however, of arguing that there are historically specific forms in which social reality is accessible and appears as a totality presupposes precisely a theory about the *unity of the object in question*. Interestingly, what in the social theory tradition is called “unity” or “totality” addresses the phenomenological tradition as “world.” The difference is that the former tradition claims that the conceptual unity must be developed conceptually, whereas the latter argues that the whole “discloses” itself to us as a framework of meaning. In my project, I intend to close this gap and treat the social form of society, i.e., a society that in its totality is formed by capital, phenomenologically. I will argue that it makes more sense to analyze the unity of social form rather than a conceptual structure as a world characterized by “meaning,” which, in turn, is constituted by interdependent social categories, such as valorized life, valorized time, and valorized space.

2: Critical Theory, Heidegger, Phenomenology (article projects)

I was asked to write two entries for a new handbook in critical theory (entry on culture industry and post-Marxism). In addition, I would like to write a longer essay on Husserl and Marx as well as Heidegger and Marx, which could be the seed articles for my major book project (see 1). In addition, I have finished an essay on Lukacs and Marx.

3: The Capitalist Schema (book, 2014; paperback, 2016)

In *The Capitalist Schema*, I argue that Kant’s idea of a mental schematism, which gives the human mind access to a stable reality, can be interpreted as a social concept, which, using Marx, I identify as money. Money and its “fluid” form, capital, constitute sociality in capitalism and make access to social reality possible. Money, in other words, makes life in capitalism meaningful and frames all social relations. Following Marx, I argue that money is the true Universal of modern life and that, as such, we are increasingly subjected to its control. As money and capital are closely linked to time, I further demonstrate that in capitalism money constitutes past and future “social horizons” by turning past and future into “monetized” horizons. Everything becomes faster, global, and more abstract. Our lives, as a consequence, become

more mobile, “fluid,” unstable, and precarious. The book contains analyses of credit, debt, and finance as examples of how money determines the meaning of future and past, imagination, and memory, and that this results in individuals becoming increasingly integrated into and dependent upon the capitalist world. This integration and dependence increases with the event of electronics industries and brain-science industries that channel all human desires towards profits, growth, and making more money. In this way, the book offers a critical extension of Adorno’s analysis of exchange and the culture industry as the basis of modern societies. We should return to basic insights of Marx’s philosophy, given that the principle of exchange is only possible on the basis of more fundamental social and economic categories, such as money.

4: Marx, The Machine Fragment (book, 2014)

I was asked to edit and introduce Marx’s so called “machine fragment” for the book series *Marxist Pocket Books* (Laika Verlag). I wrote a substantial 50 page introduction to Marx, which will be accompanied by selections from Marx’s *Grundrisse* and *Capital*. The book appeared in 2014. In the introduction, which is meant to reach a larger academic public, I argue that we should with Marx understand the process of capital and capitalist society as an ambivalent process that is characterized by two opposing tendencies, namely, on the one hand to open up venues toward a non-capitalist society and, on the other hand, the constant attempt to close those venues off.

5: Heidegger and Critical Theory (book, 2012)

Together with German colleagues I published an edition on technology and reification in Heidegger and in Critical Theory (Fink 2012). I wrote an extensive essay on the concept of schematization and Kant-reception in Adorno and Heidegger for this volume. I argue that both Heidegger and Adorno try to overcome Kant’s mental conception of schematization of “objecthood” and try to ground possible object reference in either “technology” (Heidegger) or “real abstraction” (Adorno). Both, however, fail to see the role of political economy.

Selected Publications in Area I

- “*Gegenständlichkeit*. From Marx to Lukacs and Back Again,” *Theory and Practice: Critical Theory and the Thought of Andrew Feenberg*, ed. Darrell Arnold, New York: Palgrave 2017, 71-89

- "Fiction without Fantasy. Capital Fetishism as Objective Forgetting," *Continental Thought & Theory*, 2, 2017, 364-382.
- "Left Thatcherism. Recent Critical Theory and Post-Marxism(s) in the Light of Marxian Social Ontology," *Alienation and the Future of Capitalism*, ed. Dan Krier, Leiden: Brill 2016, 93-113.
- "An der Oberfläche der Tauschgesellschaft. Kritik der Kritischen Theorie," *Prokla. Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft*, 180, 2015, 453-469.
- "The Return of Essentialism. A Critique of Graeber's Concept of Society and Communism," *Radical Philosophy Review*, 18/2, 2015, 245-262.
- "Marx contra Negri: Value, Abstract Labor, and Money," *Interventions. Contemporary Political Italian Philosophy*, ed. Antonio Calcagno, SUNY Press 2015, 217-243.
- "Is Capital a Thing? Remarks on Piketty's Concept of Capital," *Critical Sociology*, 41:2, 2015
- „Klasse und Gewalt. Kritische Anmerkungen aus Marxistischer Sicht zum Verschwinden des Klassenbegriffs in Kritischer Theorie und Post-Marxismus," *Prokla. Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft*, 176, 2014, 383-403.
- "The Transcendental Force of Money. Social Synthesis in Marx," *Rethinking Marxism*, 26/1, 2014, 130-140.
- *The Capitalist Schema. Time, Money, and the Culture of Abstraction*, Lanham: Lexington Books 2014.
- *Christian Lotz zu Karl Marx: Das Maschinenfragment*, Marxist Pocket Books, Hamburg: Laika Verlag
- "Capitalist Schematization. Political Economy, Exchange, and Objecthood in Adorno," *Zeitschrift für Kritische Theorie*, 36/17, 2013, 110-123.
- "Reification through Commodity Form or Technology? From Honneth back to Heidegger and Marx," *Rethinking Marxism*, 25/2, 2013, 184-200.
- "Warentausch und Technik als Schematisierung von Gegenständlichkeit bei Adorno und Heidegger," in *Ding und Verdinglichung. Technik- und Sozialphilosophie nach Heidegger und der kritischen Theorie*, ed. Hans Friesen, Christian Lotz, Jakob Meier and Markus Wolf, München: Fink 2012, 191-211

Area II: Continental Aesthetics, Hermeneutics of Culture

1: Essays on Art and Continental Aesthetics (book project)

As I have in the last ten years continuously worked on the connection between aesthetics, philosophy, and the arts. I intend to publish my essays as a book, especially since I follow in all essays a central concept of plastic images. The concept of plastic images runs through the entire German tradition of aesthetics and can be found in important modern artists, such as Klee and Beuys. This volume brings together unique work in phenomenology and hermeneutics of art and images. Phenomenologists and Continental philosophers, such as Gadamer, Husserl, Barthes, and Deleuze, are critically analyzed. Artists discussed range from Beuys, Klee, German Expressionists, Bacon, Richter, to van Gogh. Against theories that apply abstract theories to

examples for the purpose of illustration this book demonstrates how aesthetic insight and meaning needs to be won out of the works themselves.

2: Images, Hermeneutics, Gerhard Richter (book, 2015)

The Art of Gerhard Richter. Hermeneutics, Images, Meaning (Bloomsbury Press) presents the first philosophical investigation of, arguably, one of the most popular and important painters working today, Gerhard Richter. From monochrome painting and photo realism to conceptual art and gesture-expressive painting, Richter has transformed the spectrum of 20th-Century painting. Building upon Gadamer's notion of 'formed images', the book outlines elements of a hermeneutics and a phenomenology of images and paintings. Moreover, the hermeneutic approach to art is combined with the crucial question of how paintings and photographs are related to each other for Richter. The author suggests that paintings "open up" the fixed relation and intentionality of photographs by idealizing and essentializing the content of the photographs. By relying upon a hermeneutical and phenomenological approach, rather than working from abstract theory, *The Art of Gerhard Richter* provides philosophical insights developed out of Richter's works of art. Uncovering key philosophical aspects of Richter's work, the author's reflections discuss the relation between appearance and essence, the role of faith and hope, the dialectic of distance and nearness, the issues of death and terror, and the role of beauty and landscapes in Richter's paintings. Special attention is paid to the following paintings: First Look into the Inside of an Atom in the introduction, Window, Secretary, and Abstract Painting in chapter three, Youth Portrait in chapter four, Reader in chapter five, Moritz, Dead, Man Shot Down, Strontium and Betty in chapter six, as well as Country Path, Clouds, and Forest in chapter seven.

3: Hermeneutics of Culture, Pictures, Images (articles)

Since 2007 I have published several papers in aesthetics, visual theory, and theory of photography. One deals with Danto's conception of perception, one with Gadamer's concept of images, one with a philosophical analysis of Roland Barthes' theory of photography, two with Husserl's concept of images, and one on poetic language. I intend to extend this work towards a hermeneutical theory of images, which would offer an alternative to the two main contemporary paradigms in this field, namely semiotics and representationalism (see my essay on Barthes and photography as well as my essay on Gadamer's conception of images). I believe

that the shortcomings of both theoretical fields are based on their neglect of the full cultural and historical constitution of images as a subclass of cultural objects. So far, no one in the US – as far as I can see – has picked up these important contemporary issues from a genuine “Continental” perspective. I am especially interested in the concept of “plasticity,” which plays an important role within the German tradition of philosophy, particularly in connection with German Idealism and art education. Instead of being a psychological or cognitive concept, in Schiller, in Hegel, and also in art (such as Beuys) we find a rich ontological concept of *Gestalt* and *Gestaltung* (*formation*) as a general term for understanding the cultural coming into being of our world. In this vein, I would like to further develop Gadamer’s concept of image formations [*Gebilde*], which Gadamer only applies to art. This project is systematically oriented. I am developing this project in exchange with both classical and contemporary authors. In this vein, I have also developed a critique of Deleuze’s concept of sensation and his philosophy of painting (published in 2009).

Selected Publications in Area II

- “Sensuality, Materiality, Painting. What is Wrong with Jaspers’ and Heidegger’s van Gogh Interpretations?,” *Van Gogh among the Philosophers: Painting, Thinking, Being*, ed. David Nichols, Lexington Books 2018, 81-97.
- “Representing Capital? Mimesis, Realism, and Contemporary Photography,” *The Social Ontology of Capitalism*, ed. Daniel Krier and Mark P. Worrell, London: Palgrave 2017, 173-193.
- “Husserl, Expressionism, and the Eidetic Impulse in Brücke’s Woodcut,” *Phenomenology and the Arts*, ed. Peter Costello and Licia Carlson, Lanham: Lexington Books 2016, 91-119.
- “Art = Capital? Reflections on Joseph Beuys’ *Das Kapital Raum 1970-1977*,” *Against Value in the Arts and Education*, ed. Sam Ladkin, Robert McKay, and Emile Bojesen, Rowman & Littlefield 2016, 193-213.
- *The Art of Gerhard Richter. Hermeneutics, Images, Meaning*, London: Bloomsbury Press 2015
- “Distant Presence. Representation, Painting and Photography in Gerhard Richter’s Reader,” *Symposium. Canadian Journal for Continental Philosophy* 1/2012, 87-111
- “Poetry as Anti-Discourse. Formalism, Hermeneutics, and the Poetics of Paul Celan,” *Continental Philosophy Review*, 4/2011, 491-510.
- “Im-Bilde-sein: Husserls Phänomenologie des Bildbewusstseins,” in *Das Bild als Denkfigur. Funktionen des Bildbegriffs in der Philosophiegeschichte von Platon bis Nancy*, ed. Sabine Neuber, München: Fink 2010
- “The Historicity of the Eye. A Phenomenological Defense of the Culturalist Conception of Perception,” *Phänomenologische Forschungen – Phenomenological studies – Recherches Phénoménologiques* 2010

- “The Photographic Attitude. Barthes for Phenomenologists,” in *Phenomenology, Archaeology, Ethics: Current Investigations of Husserl’s Corpus*, ed. Sebastian Luft and Pol Vandavelde, Continuum Press 2010
- “Fritz Kaufmann’s Aesthetics,” in *Handbook of Phenomenological Aesthetics*, ed. L. Embree, Dordrecht/Boston: Springer 2010
- “Formations: Gadamer’s Hermeneutics of Images,” *Research Journal of the Iranian Academy of Arts*, 2/2009, 30-42 [English and Persian].
- “Representation or Sensation? A Critique of Deleuze’s Philosophy of Painting,” *Symposium. Canadian Journal for Continental Philosophy*, 13/1, 2009, 59-74.
- “Depiction and Plastic Perception. A Critique of Husserl’s Theory of Picture Consciousness,” in *Continental Philosophy Review*, 2007

Area III: Post-Kantian Continental Philosophy

1: Husserl, Affectivity, Subjectivity (book, 2008)

After the publication of my first book in 2005, I started to develop in more detail my Husserl interpretation published articles and unpublished papers written in German, which resulted in my second book *From Affectivity to Subjectivity*. The text is centered on what I take to be the central concept for a theory of subjectivity from a phenomenological point of view, namely the concept of affectivity. In Husserl’s theory, affectivity is the phenomenon where self-consciousness, intersubjectivity, and one’s own bodily existence come together. The manuscript was published by Palgrave in 2007. The main argument of *From Affectivity to Subjectivity* is developed in three steps: [1] In the first part of the book, I present reconsiderations of certain basic terms that Husserl introduces in his philosophy. I first show that phenomenological activity can be re-interpreted in anthropological terms. What Husserl calls his “phenomenological method,” which includes reflection, eidetic variation, and the performance of the epoche, is, I claim, an abstract development of concrete life-world experiences such as imagining, playing, and wondering. By discovering the concrete anthropological horizon of central Husserlian methodological terms (which have confused readers since their inception), their foundation in certain experiences, and the way in which they can be regarded as abstractions from those experiences, is shown. [2] In the second part of the book, I show how subjectivity, in the phenomenological sense according to which it is an area of investigation, evolves out of the sensual sphere, and that as such, subjectivity should not be analyzed apart from the lived body or apart from world experience, as some commentators have suggested. As I show, affectivity and the “openness of the subject” towards what is other than itself, is tied to the experience of

other subjects, to proto-ethical experiences, as well as to the lived body. [3] In the last part of the book, I turn to the experience of the past and future, in order to establish them as the most important features of the self's constitution. In sum, by proceeding in these three steps I am able to outline (in a non-abstractive way) three of the most important levels of human experience and its phenomenological investigation, from Husserl's point of view.

2: Husserl, Heidegger, Practical Subjectivity (book, 2005)

After having finished and defended my 370 page dissertation on Husserl and Heidegger in 2002 (published on micro fiche), I then revised and shortened the manuscript between 2002 and 2004. The text was published in 2005 (185 pages). No part of this book has been published elsewhere. An extensive review of this book in English can be found in *Husserl Studies* 2, 2008. In this book, I show that practical intentionality should be understood on the one hand as a two-level structure of environmentally bound bodily action and, on the other hand, as a self-related understanding of one's life. I develop this project on two levels, which critically explore the practical implications of Husserl's and Heidegger's theories. The argumentation is structured through two steps: [i] A first level of practical experience can be found in the actions that we perform within our surrounding world; [ii] A second level can be found in our ontological self-understanding, which prepares us to perform self-determined actions. Regarding [i] it is extensively argued that Heidegger's theory is not very helpful in finding an appropriate concept of *Umwelt* action. The main reason for this can be seen in Heidegger's lack of a center for these actions. In regard to [ii], however, I argue that Husserl's theory fails because his notions of action and decision are too weak. Here, I argue, it is Heidegger's thought that reveals the self-understanding through which the possibility for taking action at all is rendered.

3: Phenomenology (articles and books, 2004/2007)

In addition to work related to Husserl, I have worked on concepts that involve a further determination of practical subjectivity from a phenomenological point of view, in this way contributing to contemporary debates in phenomenology. I was especially interested in phenomena of regret, promising, and forgiveness, especially as neither Husserl nor Heidegger were really interested in those aspects of ethical subjectivity. My thesis is that the unity of ethical life is constituted not only by the general structure of temporality (as was laid out in *Being and Time*), but also through concrete temporal acts, such as forgiving (past) and promising

(future), the thesis of which is also important for Hannah Arendt's political philosophy. I have explored these concepts in regard to Derrida, who focuses more on the irrational aspects of the aforementioned phenomena, and, in a historical fashion, in regard to Augustine. My work on these concepts is also visible in an edition entitled *Erinnerung. Philosophische Positionen, Perspektiven und Probleme* that I prepared with two German colleagues on the concept of memory (published by Fink in 2004). My further work on phenomenological topics beyond Husserl and Heidegger is also reflected in an edition on *Phenomenology and the Non-Human Animal* which I prepared with Corinne Painter, for the Springer series, *Contributions to Phenomenology* (published in 2007).

4: Phenomenology and Fichte (articles)

I worked on German Idealists, especially J.G. Fichte. In the context of my phenomenological research, I became particularly interested in Fichte's practical philosophy and his theory of self-consciousness. I believe that Fichte's thesis about the practical nature of self-consciousness is unique in that it helps us to overcome a cognitive conception of self-consciousness. In this vein, I also published a substantial paper on Heidegger and Fichte. I have some ideas about the concept and role of conscience for a theory of political subjectivity (stretching from Luther to Bonhoeffer and Badiou), but so far I have not further developed my ideas.

Selected Publications in Area III

- "Luther's influence on Heidegger," *Encyclopedia of Martin Luther and the Reformation*, ed. Mark A. Lampert and George Thomas Kurian, London: Rowman&Littlefield 2017, 320-323.
- "Husserl as the Modern Plato? On Hopkins' Reading of Husserl," *Comparative and Continental Philosophy*, with Corinne Painter, 2/2011, 255-268.
- "Passivität," *Philosophische Rundschau* 58, 2011, 1-8.
- "Faith, Freedom, Conscience. Luther, Fichte, and the Principle of Inwardness," in *The Devil's Whore: Reason and Philosophy in the Lutheran Tradition*, ed. Jennifer Hockenbery Dragseth, Fortress Press 2011, 95-101.
- From Affectivity to Subjectivity. Husserl's Phenomenology Revisited, London: Palgrave 2008
- Phenomenology and the Non-Human Animal. At the Limits of Experience, with Corinne Painter (eds.), *Contributions to Phenomenology*, Dordrecht: Springer 2007
- "Existential Idealism? Fichte and Heidegger," in *Epoché*, Vol. 12, 1/2007, 109-135.
- "Cognitivism and Practical Intentionality. A Critique of Dreyfus' Critique of Husserl," *International Philosophy Quarterly*, 2/2007, 153-166.

- "Psyche or Person? Husserl's Phenomenology of Animals," in *Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven der Phänomenologie*, ed. D. Lohmar and D. Fonfara, Phänomenologica, Boston: Springer, 2006, 190-204.
- "Responsive Life and Speaking To the Other. A Phenomenological Interpretation of Book One of Augustine's *Confessions*," *Augustinian Studies*, 37/1, 2006, 89-109.
- "The Events of Morality and Forgiveness: Kant and Derrida," *Research in Phenomenology*, 36/2006, 255-273.
- "Action: Phenomenology of Wishing and Willing in Husserl and Heidegger," *Husserl Studies*, 2/2006, 121-135.
- *Vom Leib zum Selbst. Kritische Analysen zu Husserl and Heidegger*, Freiburg: Alber 2005
- "Non-Epistemic Self-Awareness. On Heidegger's Reading of Kant's Practical Philosophy," *Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology*, Vol 36, No. 1, 2005.
- "Tod, Wille, Zeit. Die praktische Konzeption des Selbstbewusstseins bei Lévinas", in *Lévinas' Ethik im Kontext*, Christian Kupke (Hrsg.), Berlin: Parodos Verlag 2005, 73-92.
- *Erinnerung. Philosophische Positionen, Perspektiven und Probleme*, with T.Wolf and W.Ch. Zimmerli (eds.), München: Fink 2004
- "Schuld und Reue. Zur Konstitution der Erinnerung in ethischen Selbstverhältnissen", in *Erinnerung. Philosophische Positionen, Perspektiven und Probleme*, Chr. Lotz, T.Wolf und W.Ch. Zimmerli (Hrsg.), München: Fink 2004, 147-161
- "Recollection, Mourning and the Absolute Past: Husserl, Freud and Derrida," *New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, Vol.3, Nr. 4, 2004, 121-141.
- "Sehnsüchtiges Sein. Anmerkungen zu Fichte und Husserl," *Fichte-Studies* 22, 2003, 155-169
- "Von der Empfindung zur Zärtlichkeit. Wertfühlen, Sehnen und Selbstaffektion (Husserl und Levinas)", in *Jahrbuch der Gesellschaft für Philosophie und Wissenschaften von der Psyche*, Würzburg: Königshausen&Neumann 2003, 113-137.
- *Subjektivität - Verantwortung - Wahrheit. Neue Aspekte der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls*, with D. Carr (eds.), Frankfurt/M.: Lang 2002
- "Phantasie, Eidetik, Spiel. Überlegungen zur faktischen Herkunft philosophischen Bewußtseins", in *Subjektivität - Verantwortung - Wahrheit. Neue Aspekte der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls*, David Carr, Christian Lotz (Hrsg.), Frankfurt/M.: Lang 2002, 87-103
- "Husserls Genuss. Über den Zusammenhang von Leib, Affektion, Fühlen und Werthaftigkeit," *Husserl-Studies*, 18/1, 2002, 19-39
- "Verfügbare Unverfügbarkeit. Über theoretische Grenzen und praktische Möglichkeiten der Erinnerung bei Husserl," *Phänomenologische Forschungen - Phenomenological studies - Recherches Phénoménologiques*, 1/2002, 207-231
- "Mitmachende Spiegelleiber. Anmerkungen zur Phänomenologie konkreter Intersubjektivität bei Husserl," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 56, 1/2002, 72-95
- "Versprechen - Verzeihen, Erinnern - Vergessen. Zur ethischen Konstitution der Subjektivität," *Studia Philosophica* 60/2001, 77-94.
- "Erinnerte Zukunft. Über die Möglichkeit der Verzeihung im Angesicht des Holocaust," *Universitas. Zeitschrift für interdisziplinäre Wissenschaft* 1/2001, 62-71.

- “Certainty of Oneself. On Fichte’s Conception of Conscience as Non-epistemic Self-Understanding,” *Southwest Philosophy Review*, 20/1, 2004, 25-36.
- (unpublished) Conscience and Resistance. Hegel, Fichte, Bonhoeffer.