1. Materialism
   a. Dialectical materialism positions itself against metaphysics; however, S wonders how one can make basic assumptions about the relation between spirit and matter without the inclusion of metaphysics (162)
   b. Engels tries to eliminate subjectivity in his philosophy of nature. S argues that Engels turns subjects into objects without properly reflecting on the process through which he turns himself into the objective eye (163); remember: intentionality is absolute for S
   c. Experience is always first; for example, temperature is first a phenomenon of the for-itself before it can be grasped as quantity (164)
   d. If it is true that dialectical materialism presupposes that the real is rational (i.e., follows dialectical development), where does it get its certitude, i.e., something subjective, from; given that materialism eliminates the for-itself; it can only work with scientific probabilities
   e. Materialism can argue that consciousness is an effect of a material cause, but the relation between thought and object is not causal, thought “expresses” the object; i.e., intentionality is absolute, causality is itself a phenomenon (162)
   f. The causality that the materialist operates with does not lead to any totalities; the effect cannot contain more than what is in the cause; however, dialectical materialism operates with totalities (the whole, process, “the” society, “the” history, etc.); in addition, totalities are presupposed in the idea of evolutionary or historical progression (165)
   g. Marx begins with the “richest notion” (the whole, the concrete), but science begins with the most abstract notion (laws, principles, etc.), science cannot develop a theory that shows that the parts are contained in the whole
   h. Dogmatic Marxists want to believe in science, but reject all principles on which good science is built upon, such as reflection, critique, skepticism, anti-dogmatism, anti-authority) (167) [this is a critique of soviet style dogmatic Marxism in France]
   i. Most importantly, materialism cannot explain the constitution of “revolutionary class consciousness” (171), i.e., Sartre argues that his theory of the for-itself is needed for explaining the consciousness of the oppressed class of itself (170); “Never will a state of the world produce a consciousness of class” → that’s why we need revolutionaries, that’s why we need political and historical agents; materialism cannot explain the premise of its own theory, namely that the working class will overturn the state of affairs; there is a rupture, freedom, that we need to take into account; Sartre argues that without the constitution of the class as an agent, which cannot be explained by cause and effect, the present condition cannot be overcome; S argues from now on for the primacy of political action, philosophy has to be politically engaged

2. Materialism as a weapon
   a. Given all these problems, in particular the attempt of materialists to eliminate subjectivity, S proposes to use materialism pragmatically, i.e. as a social weapon to battle idealisms. Since idealism is taken as a doctrine of the dominating class, materialism
becomes the ideological weapon of the oppressed class (166); in fact, Marx proposes something like this in his early writings

i. “In the struggle against that state of affairs, criticism is no passion of the head, it is the head of passion. It is not a lancet, it is a weapon. Its object is its enemy, which it wants not to refute but to destroy. [...] Criticism does not need to make things clear to itself as regards this object, for it has already settled accounts with it. It no longer assumes the quality of an end-in-itself, but only of a means. Its essential pathos is indignation, its essential work is denunciation.” (Marx, Contributions to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Introduction)

b. As history shows, materialism was always the doctrine of revolutionary attitudes (S mentions Epicurus)

3. The revolutionary

a. Revolution = profound change of property relations (unfortunately S does not say much more about this, as it could have lead him to say more about the constitution of society...) (167); here again, S does not pay much attention to structures of society constituted by social-economic categories

b. The revolutionary speaks to a particular class, although his position is universal; the ruling class speaks to the entire society, although his social position is particular

c. The revolutionary wants the destruction of the oppressing class; she is not an insurgent (168)

i. Transcendence of situation towards the future
ii. Comprehends history as a totality
iii. Is the historic agent
iv. Realizes the present from the standpoint of a future humanity
v. Standpoint of labor
vi. Revolutionary solidarity
vii. Thought = action

d. The ideology of the ruling class is based on the premise (168)

i. that one is on earth by divine right (unquestioned, everything is “there” for them)
ii. that one has the right to exist
iii. that the world is made for them
iv. that they command

e. The position of the working class is based on the premise (169)

i. that it receives its existence via the ruling class
ii. that one needs to struggle for existence
iii. that one does not have the right to exist (hence struggle)
iv. that there is no “divine” place in society for it
v. that the privileges of the ruling class need to be destroyed
vi. that the rights that the ruling class as invented need to be destroyed
vii. that values that are declared to be universal by the ruling class are in truth only particular and instruments of oppression (170)

f. The revolutionary speaks

i. For the entire class
ii. From the standpoint of humanity
4. Revolutionary philosophy shows that
   a. Human beings are contingent (no divine right, no aristocracy, no natural claim to govern, etc.)
   b. Collectively established orders can be overcome
   c. That the current values, even if declared as universal values, reflect the particular social position of the ruling class
   d. Can only disclose itself to the oppressed (172)

5. Conclusions
   a. “Revolutionary man must be a contingent being [here EXISTENTIALISM], unjustifiable but free, entirely immersed in the society that oppresses him [here MARXISM], but capable of transcending this society by his efforts to change it. Idealism [RULING CLASS] mystifies him in that it binds him by rights and values that are already given; it conceals from him his power to devise roads of his own. But materialism also mystifies him, by depriving him of his freedom. The revolutionary philosophy [EXISTENTIAL MARXISM] must be a philosophy of transcendence” (170)
   b. Here is S’s blow: contemporary Marxism is dogmatic, mechanistic, fears freedom and risk, smuggles in a priori knowledge where there is none, and reduces history to a developing idea [i.e., S. argues that it falls back onto Hegelian idealism] (171); for Sartre, without freedom “the triumph of socialism is not assured at all” (172)
   c. Surprising overall point 1: without a philosophy of freedom (which the Marxist take to be a form of idealism) Marxism is a form of idealism!
   d. Surprising overall point 2: though S states that the CP is the only revolutionary party, he criticizes the party of having no revolutionary philosophy, i.e., they need to sober up and include existentialism as a philosophy of freedom into their doctrine...

6. Looking forward
   a. In chapter one of *Search for a Method* S unleashes a similar critique: contemporary Marxism in France (around 1955) “stopped” (21) to be a “living Marxism” (26) and fell back on dogmatic presentations of a “truth a priori” (27) and “scholasticism” (28); the main problem, S argues, is that in the official versions “history is made without self-awareness” (29) [Uhhh... here we go] and that, as he says with Marx, “men themselves [...] make their history” (31); so, Sartre – in line with other so called “Western” Marxists, such as the Frankfurt School philosophers – [a] positions Marx against party line Marxism and “doctrines,” and [b], argues for a new political doctrine.