Protocol, Graduate Seminar – From Husserl to Levinas
Class Session: 1 - Date: January 10, 2012
Minute taker: Christian Lotz
Topic: Introduction to the seminar and discussion of Husserl’s concept of intentionality

Abbreviations
LI2 = Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume Two; ID1 = Husserl, Ideas, Volume One; AP = Husserl, Analyses; CM = Husserl, Cartesian Meditations; TI = Levinas, Totality and Infinity; DE = Levinas, Discovering Existence with Husserl; A = Derrida, Adieu, CP = Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers

Introduction
The class session began with general remarks about the seminar and introductory remarks on Husserl and Levinas. Lotz underlined that this seminar will be challenging for everyone, him included, for the following reasons: [1] we are unable to focus on a single text, [2] it is difficult to understand the break between German and French thought, and [3] Husserl’s thinking is vast and it takes time to understand how to bring a systematic order into his philosophy; in addition, [4] Levinas’ writing style requires slow and meditative readings. Toward this end, Lotz proposed that we try to make our way into Husserl and Levinas by selecting the core issue that allow us to see more clearly the similarities and the differences between both philosophers (and subsequently the break between German and French phenomenology). At least one of the things we want to learn is how to think about the same issue within two different frameworks. Lotz, with his infinite wisdom, determined beforehand that we will focus on the following questions: [1] what is intentionality?, [2] what is the relation between intentionality and sensation?, and [3] what is sensibility and how would a phenomenology of sensibility and affectivity look?, and, finally, [4] which conception of intersubjectivity follows from a phenomenology of sensibility? Given these questions, it is clear that Lotz (in contradistinction to some other scholars) believes that it is not primarily the conception of intersubjectivity that separates Husserl and Levinas; rather, it is their different take on sensation, affection, and time that determines their concepts of otherness.1 Finally, understanding Husserl’s and Levinas’ analyses of sensibility and intentionality also leads to understanding a core issue in Derrida’s philosophy, namely, hospitality and the gift. Accordingly, Lotz believes that it is not sufficient to simply claim that Levinas wants to go “beyond intentionality;” we need to find out how exactly this is related to the essence of intentionality and different conceptions of otherness and ethics, which includes the rejection of phenomenology as transcendental in Levinas.

Weekend Seminar
Lotz mentioned that in the past he has organized weekend seminars that always were fun and very philosophical (photos available online on his web page). If the seminar participants would like to do such a weekend seminar (which would lead to cancelling 2-3 class sessions), then he would be willing to check out whether we could find an appropriate location for such a weekend seminar. Please let him know if you want to do such a weekend seminar; otherwise, there will be a day seminar in Chelsea at his place on April 21st on Derrida. Food and drinks will be provided by Lotz. Usually, these meetings are open-ended.

Note
Lotz pointed out that he does not think of graduate seminars as a form of “informational” teaching. Accordingly, this seminar is neither a complex undergraduate seminar nor is it an introduction or an overview of Husserl and/or Levinas; rather, the seminar is based upon the shared desire on the side of

1 For example, in his Introduction to Phenomenology, at no point does Moran mention that the real issue in Totality and infinity is Levinas’ treatment of the sensible sphere (if compared with Husserl).
the professor and the participants to understand the material as appropriately as possible in regard to a major issue. The issue in this seminar is, roughly put, the dividing line between German and French phenomenology. It should be clear, then, that this seminar does not even come close to discussing Husserl’s or Levinas’ philosophies as a whole and that students should be clear that, given the scope of thought discussed this semester, this seminar should not be taken as a representation of these thinker’s entire philosophies. Students who want to be “informed” about either Husserl or Levinas should read Moran’s introduction to phenomenology, drop out and take a different seminar. Lotz underlined that he will always lecture about the texts and that these texts need to be prepared in a rigorous fashion by every seminar participant. In addition, Lotz expects that the texts selected for class will not simply be “read,” rather, it is expected that everyone in class will study the texts. In addition, he expects that – if someone does not understand the primary texts – he or she either makes an appointment with Lotz or consults the secondary literature, such as Zahavi, Moran, or Mohanty.

Announcements
Lotz forgot to mention that he tried to invite a guest speaker for this seminar, but that due to the dense spring schedule the chair rejected his request. He announced that there will be one guest lecture by the love of his life, Corinne Painter, on Levinas’ concept of the other on April 5th. She holds a PhD from Loyola University in Chicago and studied under the directorship of A. Peperzak who is the single most important scholar on Levinas in the US.²

Literature
Lotz recommended Moran, Zahavi, Mohanty (and Hopkins for methodological issues) as reference authors for questions on Husserl; and Peperzak and Bergo as good authors on Levinas. Note: Whereas Moran’s chapter on Husserl is very insightful, his chapter on Levinas in his introduction is not very sympathetic to Levinas and thus not very helpful for an attempt to understand Levinas’ thought.

Lead Questions

1. LI2: Why is Husserl’s concept of intentionality not a psychological concept?
2. LI2: What is the relation between H’s concept of intentionality and the non-intentional moment of intentionality?
3. LI2: What is H’s concept of feelings and how is it related to the priority of theoretical acts (presentations, Vorstellungen)?
4. ID1: What is the function of the epoché?
5. ID1: What is the horizontal conception of intentionality?
6. ID1: What is the role of time within this conception?
7. ID1: What is the relation between intentionality and hyle?
8. ID1: What is the act relation between noema and noesis?
9. AP: How is the body and the kinaesthese related to the relation asked about in question eight?
10. AP: How does Husserl think about association?
11. AP: What is the relation between association and affection?
12. AP: What is the relation between affection and time?
13. AP: Why is the phenomenon of expectation so important for Husserl, and how does his analysis lead to a different conception of otherness?
14. CM: What is the relation between apperception, affection, and paring within the context of Husserl’s concept of intersubjectivity?
15. DE: Why does Levinas introduce the phenomenon of proximity into his analysis of sensibility?
16. TI: What is enjoyment and how does this revolutionize the concept of affection and affectivity?

² Check http://www.luc.edu/philosophy/faculty_peperzak_hom.shtml
17. Ti: What is the relation between time, death, and self-consciousness?
18. Ti: Why is Levinas’ concept of otherness the consequence of 15-17?
19. Ti: How is the phenomenon of eros related to Levinas’ concept of otherness?
20. A: How does Derrida take up Levinas’ concept of otherness as non-intentional and how does this lead to his (Derrida’s) general conception of hospitality?

Examples of how sensation was treated within the tradition

Russell’s account of sensation can serve us as a good example for how we will not treat sensation, sensibility, and intentionality. Russell writes in the Problems of Philosophy:

“Thus it becomes evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the same as what we immediately experience by sight or touch or hearing. The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known. Hence, two very difficult questions at once arise; namely, (1) Is there a real table at all? (2) If so, what sort of object can it be? It will help us in considering these questions to have a few simple terms of which the meaning is definite and clear. Let us give the name of ‘sense-data’ to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. We shall give the name ‘sensation’ to the experience of being immediately aware of these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour, we have a sensation of the colour, but the awareness itself is the sensation. The colour is that of which we are immediately aware, and the awareness itself is the sensation. It is plain that if we are to know anything about the table, it must be by means of the sense-data -- brown colour, oblong shape, smoothness, etc. -- which we associate with the table; but, for the reasons which have been given, we cannot say that the table is the sense-data, or even that the sense-data are directly properties of the table. Thus a problem arises as to the relation of the sense-data to the real table, supposing there is such a thing. The real table, if it exists, we will call a ‘physical object’. Thus we have to consider the relation of sense-data to physical objects. The collection of all physical objects is called ‘matter’. Thus our two questions may be re-stated as follows: (1) Is there any such thing as matter? (2) If so, what is its nature?”

However we extend this picture in recent philosophy, we need to take into account that Husserl and phenomenology as a whole – for reasons we need to discuss – try to overcome a psychological account of sensation, which offers a theory of sensation that assumes that: [1] sensations are “in” consciousness whereas objects are “outside” of consciousness, [2] sensations are sensations of objects, and [3] there is some connection between sensations and the objects sensed either [2.1] through causality or [2.2] through “expressions” (signs, etc.).

The Main Question of the Seminar: Husserl vs. Levinas

In order to enter a discussion of our topic, we should compare a central passage in Husserl with a central passage in Levinas. What is striking in these passages is that both treat the sensible sphere in a completely different manner, though Levinas - at least at the time of Totality and Infinity - never goes (completely) beyond the Husserlian framework. Here is what Husserl says about the sensible sphere:

“Apperception is our surplus, which is found in experience itself, in its descriptive content as opposed in the raw existence of sense: it is the act-character which as it were ensouls sense and is in essence such as to make us perceive this or that object, see this tree, e.g., hear this ringing, smell this scent of flowers etc., etc. Sensations, and the acts ‘interpreting’ them or apperceiving them, are alike experienced, but they do not appear as objects: they are not seen, heard or perceived by any sense.” (L12, 109)

Though this quote is only representative for Husserl’s early work, it nevertheless brings out one of the most central theses of his phenomenology, namely [1] that the structure of consciousness needs to be seen in its apperceptive character, i.e., as forms of intentionalities that are object-directed and [2] within which the sensible sphere is only a part of the intentional act itself, the consequence of which is that the sensible sphere does not appear as such and thus it plays a co-constitutive function in all world
constitution and meaning constitution. Husserl does not deny in the \( L/I \) that we need to investigate more closely the sensible sphere, but he claims (due to his attempt to establish phenomenology as an anti-psychologistic discipline) that the object-constitution has priority of everything else, which can also be interpreted as the thesis that synthesis is the overarching structure of consciousness. Levinas will move away from this position, as he claims that this synthetic structure is itself based on something that cannot (and can never) be synthesized, namely, the other or the rupture of synthesis through something that remains outside of synthesis or any form of assimilation. We need to take into account, though, that Husserl introduces many modifications of this original position in his later work, most importantly, [1] in the analysis of the primordial impression and time, which he offers in his lectures on inner time consciousness as well as [2] the development of “genetic phenomenology” and his analysis of the whole aesthetic sphere (sense fields, bodily kinaesthetic constitution, associations, etc.).

Nevertheless, we will hopefully see that Husserl never went so far as to claim that the sensible sphere itself contains or depends upon “transcendence,” as Levinas claims. For example, Levinas writes in Proximity and Language (1965):

“...But in the gustative sensation, intentionality, that is, the openness upon the savor, already presupposes the detachment of the taster. The primordial signifying character of sensation itself is not equivalent to the role of being a ‘thought thinking something.’ Psychologists know at least the affective charge of savors, but the psyche in, or the signifyingness of, this charge is immediately interpreted either as a ‘state’ or as an intention of another type, certainly, than the theoretical type, but still always as an openness, a comprehension - an information about oneself, or, as in Heidegger, a comprehension of man's disposition in being, i.e., always as an ontology. Every transcendence is conceived as a knowing. To be sure, this search for intentionality in the sensible avoided the pure and simple mechanization of sensibility, which the positivists wanted. But the structure of openness, discerned in all sensibility, resembles the structure of sight, in which the sensibility is invested as a knowing. Yet we can ask if, even in its intellectual function, sight has completely lost its other way of signifying, and if the expression ‘to eat up with one's eyes’ has to be taken as a pure metaphor. We must ask if every transcendence belongs to the sphere of the intellect. For if, for example, the gustative sensation is not exhausted in knowings about savors, the surplus of sense does not amount to a consciousness of the physico-physiological process of alimentation, nor to the consciousness of associated acts of biting, mastication, etc. The signification proper to gustative sensation consists, somehow, in ‘breaking through’ the knowledge gathered, to, as it were, penetrate into the inwardness of things. Nothing here resembles a covering over of something aimed at by a given, as Husserl's notion of fulfillment would require. Here the psyche resolves neither into consciousness nor into unconsciousness. In sensation something comes to pass between the feeling and the felt, below the openness of the feeling upon the felt, of consciousness upon a phenomenon. We have chosen the example of gustative sensation because this schema of consumption is found in all the forms of sensibility; to feel the world is always a way of being nourished by it.” (CP, 117-118)

As Lotz explained in class, the core of Levinas’ whole thinking is contained in this quote. For introductory purposes it seems to be sufficient to point to three aspects of what Levinas addresses in this quote: [1] Levinas assumes that the sensible sphere has itself a “signifying” character without being subjected to thought (i.e., to an act in Husserl’s philosophy); [2] he assumes that the sensible sphere should not be simply subjected to a universal structure to which the sensible sphere can be subjugated (i.e., to an ontology); [3] the real character of sensibility is a form of inner transcendence that does not have the form of noetic meaning constitution. Paradoxically put, Levinas is in search of a breakdown of intentionality before intentionality - or within intentionality. Hospitality is, accordingly, a term that refers to the “openness” of consciousness before it opens up. Consequently, whereas for Husserl the problem of otherness within the ego as well as with another ego is a problem of intentionality, for Levinas, it is a problem of sensibility and some other form of non-intentionality, which leads to Levinas’ conception of “ethics.” In addition, for Levinas, the other breaks through and ruptures the field of ontology (the being of the subject) and the constitution of meaning (intentionality). We need to discuss, accordingly, also the question of whether Levinas’ philosophy is still phenomenology in the proper sense.
**Phenomenology in Husserl, initial remark**

We will see in this class – though we would need to read Merleau-Ponty for the entire picture – that the phenomenological tradition deviated from [a] the traditional conception of the thing as an *object*, [b] the traditional ontological conception of (intentional) acts as *somehow being mental and inner* (in distinction from bodily acts), and [c] the empirical conception of knowledge and abstraction. The last point is very important for the following two reasons:

[A] It is still the case that many scholars believe that phenomenology is based on empirical descriptions (“narrations”) of personal experience. We can see, however, even without reading Husserl’s account of abstraction (against the empirical tradition) in the second LI and without reading his theory of eidetic variation and eidetic ‘seeing’, that we are not dealing with an empirical description of acts; rather, Husserl speaks of an “abstract ideation” through which we will be able to grasp the “pure species” of different kind of acts (102). For example, describing the difference between imagination and recollection depends upon the *eidos* of and the ideal invariant of the distinction between these acts.

[B] Husserl’s claim that we need to go back to experience does not mean that we describe “experiences;” rather, phenomenology is the rigorous discipline and analysis of those acts or act-complexes through which objects and object-classes are *originally* constituted. Phenomenology in this sense means to go back to those acts through which objects constitute themselves as these objects (accordingly, it requires an ontology of the world as, in Husserl’s own words, its “guiding clue.”). The latter is also the meaning of Husserl’s famous imperative “Going back to the issues themselves” [*Zurück zu den Sachen selbst*]. For example, the perception of a tool involves at least two levels: first, we need to apperceive the object as something *perceived*, which would require an eidetic analysis of the act of perception and the perceived object; second, we need to apperceive the object as something *practical*, which would require an eidetic analysis of the act of will, desire, etc., and the used object (see Heidegger in BT); third, we need to apperceive the object as something that we can bodily “handle,” which would require an eidetic analysis of the lived body in conjunction with practical apperception.

Moreover, if we assume that phenomenology is not psychology, but a universal *founding* discipline that investigates the universal structures of reason, then we need to assume that there is a “dimension” in which all other experiences are constituted. For example, we cannot simply assume that there is a causal connection between the world and the body, as this already presupposes the constitution of the world as something causal, the body as something that depends upon causality, etc. This is important, as it might not be the case that the body *originally* is constituted as something dependent upon causality. According to Husserl, this means that only if we assume a transcendental dimension can we conceive of phenomenology as a *universal* discipline and as a first philosophy that can, in principle, thematize and analyze the *whole universe*, as the *meaningfulness* of everything including the universe – whether it exists or not – is itself constituted within the transcendental dimension. Transcendental subjectivity is that dimension *in which* all other phenomena are constituted. As a consequence, Husserl’s overcoming of the psychological concept of intentionality led to a radical *opening up* (DE, 135) of consciousness to the whole unity of experience, i.e., to the world. Instead of investigating the relation between a psyche on the one hand and the reality on the other hand, Husserl *discovered* a new realm that he termed “transcendental subjectivity,” which is conceived as the *a priori* correlation between the *how of acts* and the *how of what is given in these (specific) acts*. Every world phenomenon can, accordingly, be investigated in its structure and can be brought back to the moments of these complex experiences. Factual experience becomes, now, “animated” and something “alive” and constituted. The phenomenologist, in other words, detects the simple “being there” of the world as a complex network of meaningful acts. Lotz pointed out that he believes that it was precisely this opening up of the whole constituted world that made Husserl’s philosophy attractive for so many philosophers at the beginning of the 20th century. Often overlooked, though, is the *rationalist* basis of his claims, which make *absolute* claims about the enlightening force of philosophy. As Husserl puts it in the *Crisis*, the self-explanatory nature not only of the pre-theoretical everyday world but also of complex
worlds, such as mathematics and physics, will be transformed by phenomenology into something understood (as we understand with the help of Husserl’s phenomenology how its intrinsic meaningfulness comes about). As Husserl assumes that this understanding can be reached universally (including all of history), it is safe to place Husserl within the great tradition of European rationalism. Though some of us might think of this universalism as the idea of a crazy maniac, we should see that Husserl made an impressive step towards his goals by simply looking over the more than 50 volumes of his Collected Works. Even if you do not become a Husserlian, he offers something for everyone interested in the issues themselves (Sachen an sich). We need to note here, though, that Husserl did not reach this universalist position before 1911 (and, in fact, he does not really publish it before the mid-30s). In the Logical Investigations, for example, he still believes that phenomenology is a special discipline that investigates meaning constitution in regard to the psyche alone, as the prior ontological region for all other regions (i.e., the mind as constitutive for nature, history, person, etc.). During the time of the LI he thought of phenomenology as the founding discipline of psychology. Since psychology at that point was conceived as the founding discipline of all sciences, Husserl assumed that phenomenology would become the founding discipline on a meta-level. Husserl then radically changed his conception of phenomenology, since with the Ideas I (1913) he assumes that even the psyche is a phenomenon that is constituted as psyche within what he then calls transcendental subjectivity. For example, the difference between the psyche and the body is itself not simply “there,” but is itself constituted as a meaningful difference.

**Introduction to Husserl’s concept of intentionality**

Husserl’s invention can only be properly grasped if we take into account that it was developed in opposition to empirical and psychological theories of knowledge, as well as against the still strong tradition of German Idealism and the positivism prevailing at the end of the 19th century.

**Erlebnisse**

Husserl distinguishes between “Erlebnisse” [living through, sometimes misleadingly translated as “mental experiences” or “experiences”] and acts. Whereas acts are always object-directed, consciousness “lives through” these acts, but is itself not object-directed. The concept of consciousness is in the LI still heavily influenced by Hume, though Husserl revises it by 1913.

**Intentionality, Inner, Outer**

From the beginning on, in his fifth LI Husserl is concerned with what he conceives as a psychologistic (and often also naturalistic) conception of intentionality, namely, the idea that we need to deal with the so called “mental inexistence of an object” (LI2, 95) as something consciousness is directed towards. Though Husserl believes that we need to start here, ultimately he rejects this theory for three reasons: [1] the usage of the term “consciousness” is unclear; [2] the role of the intentional content is unclear; and [3] it is not clear whether we need to make a distinction between existence and non-existence. Instead, Husserl claims that [1] the essence of consciousness is intentionality (which then can be sub-classified into types of intentionalities), [2] the content of an act needs to be differentiated into what is part of the act itself as well as into what the act is directed towards, though that towards which the act is directed is not itself part of the act (=intentional object). The intentional object, therefore, is “act transcendent,” even while it somehow does not transcend consciousness (if we mean by this that it would be “outside” of consciousness, [3] we do not need the distinction between mental and non-mental. For example, the difference between a perception and an imagination is not that the object of a perception exists and the object of an imagination does not exist; rather, the difference between perception and imagination must be found in their intrinsic modes of how the object is given in these acts. In addition, as Husserl underlines at the beginning of §11 (and as I have explained above), the field of phenomenology should not be restricted to psychological phenomena; rather, “on our view all experiences are in this respect on a level” (LI2, 97). The most important move, however, is his rejection
of any naturalization that could occur when we talk about the psyche, on the one hand, and something that the psyche is not, on the other hand. Husserl writes:

“It is always quite questionable, and frequently misleading, to say that perceived, imagined, asserted or desired objects, etc. ‘enter consciousness’ (or do so in a perceptual, presentative fashion, etc.), or to say, conversely, that ‘consciousness,’ ‘the ego,’ enters into this or that sort of relation to them, or to say that such objects are taken up into consciousness in this or that way, or to say, similarly, that intentional experiences ‘contain something as their objects in themselves’ etc., etc... Such expressions promote two misunderstandings: first, that we are dealing with a real (realen) event or a real (reales) relationship, taking place between consciousness or ‘the ego’, on the one hand, and the thing of which there is consciousness, on the other; and secondly, that we are dealing with a relation between two things.” (LI2, 98)

What Husserl points out here is related to the conception of phenomenology as a descriptive discipline and not a discipline that starts out with metaphysical or ontological presuppositions, such as the existence of the mind, on the one hand, and reality, on the other hand. We are not dealing here with a relation between two entities; rather, we are dealing here with the essential structure of consciousness itself, which is to say, we simply describe the act structure instead of turning it into something “real:” “only one thing is present, the intentional experience, whose essential descriptive character is the intention in question” (LI2, 98). From this it (almost) automatically follows that the intentional object is not part of the act, which is to say that although the act is directed towards the object (and the directedness belongs to the essence of the act) the object is in no way “contained” in the act, which, in turn, also no longer permits us to talk about objects as being “in” consciousness. Whether I perceive, remember, or imagine an object does not turn that object into a “mental” object. Descriptively, however, we need to say that the object transcends the act and its features:

“It makes no essential difference to an object presented and given to consciousness whether it exists, or is ficticious, or is perhaps completely absurd.” (LI2, 99)

Consequently, we need to make a sharp distinction between the “truly immanent contents” of the intentional experiences that are as such non-intentional (ibid.). Not only because of the difficulties related to the term “mental content” but also because of translation issues, we should simply avoid talking about “mental” and “non-mental,” as this distinction itself is not a “fact” or a simple given; instead, this distinction itself must be constituted within an absolute dimension.

Attention, background, foreground
Husserl’s brief remark about attention on p.102 is important for what he further elaborates in the Ideas. He claims that an intentional object does not need to be “noticed or attended to” (LI2, 102), as the intentional experience can be complex and it might be the case, for example, that we are attentive of the front-side of a die while still being directed towards the die. This theory will lead to the horizontal conception of intentionality in Ideas I and foreshadows Husserl’s thesis that intentionality always contains a “surplus” of empty intentions that are not (yet) fulfilled. The thesis that intentionality should not be confused with attentionality also helps Husserl to claim that by “acts” he does not refer to an activity, e.g., to the activity of an ego (or a Fichtean conception of the ego). After the LI, Husserl changes his conception of the ego. He slightly revises this conception in the Ideas I, where he claims there that we do not find intentionality without at least a partial activity of the ego, which, then, in turn, makes it possible for us to be affected by something.

Apperception
Husserl deals in §14 with one of the most central conceptions of his philosophy, namely, the concept of apperception. He starts out discussing what at that time was called the “constancy hypothesis,” i.e., the assumption that perceptions of different things must include different sensational data. Husserl,
however, argues against this theory, insofar as he claims that we can have different apperceptions of objects, by which he means different interpretations of the same sensational basis. For example, when Lotz went for the first time to the famous wax cabinet in London, he saw a door opener at the entrance of the building. When he came closer to the person, however, his perception suddenly switched to something else, namely, he realized that this was not a living person but a wax figure. Nothing had changed about the wax figure itself, however. Or, take Wittgenstein’s famous rabbit/goose example. Your perception switches from seeing a rabbit to seeing a goose despite the fact that the sensational data do not change. Similarly, Husserl claims that “interpretation [Auffassung] itself can never be reduced to an influx of new sensations; it is an act character, a mode of consciousness” (LI2, 103).

Husserl explains this thesis by giving one of his famous examples, which in this case is the perception of a “box.” In the Cartesian Meditations it will be a die (as you can see, Husserl is quite creative…). Though – while perceiving a box that is moved and tilted – the “content” of consciousness (according to psychologistic vocabulary) constantly changes, I always see the same box. In addition, while I perceive the box, the box is apperceived constantly in the form of an identity: I always mean the same box while turning it in front of my eyes (LI2, 104). We should note here that throughout Husserl’s writing he uses to discuss these changes, as at this point (around 1900) Husserl had not yet fully developed his theory of the noema (the how of the givenness of the object), his phenomenology of time, or his analyses of bodily kinaestheses, all of which we will encounter in this class when we read the first four sections of his Analyses. In any case, given that the intentional object is apperceived in its identity, Husserl is quick to point out that the difference between acts and act classes cannot be the object (its existence or inexistence, its “objective” features, etc.), since the intentional object does not change whether I imagine it or whether I perceive it. Consequently, the difference between these acts must be found in their descriptive, i.e., eidetic, “act-character” (LI2, 105) differences.

**Epoche**

Although Husserl does not yet have a full theory of the phenomenological reduction (as he presents it in Ideas I), he already indicates something similar on p.105, inasmuch as he claims that the foregoing argument must lead to a position that takes acts only in their descriptive character and qualities. Put differently, the existence is not a problem for a phenomenologist, as the phenomenologist claims that we will only be able to see the intentional character of experiences if we “bracket” metaphysical questions. Lotz pointed out that we should keep in mind that Husserl has not yet introduced the noema, which leads him to assume in the Logical Investigations that there is a simple difference between act and object. For example, he says: “To refer to the world may be an experience, but the world itself is the object intended” (LI2, 106). Husserl will come to a much more elaborated and complex analysis of this relation in the Ideas I and in his later genetic phenomenology.

**Intentionality and feelings**

The question of how feelings are related to intentionality is central for our seminar, as Husserl discusses here the question of whether feelings are mere subjective associations or whether they are object directed. With Brentano, Husserl assumes that they are object directed, but that it is unclear whether feelings are founded upon theoretical acts (=presentations). A felt object presupposes an act that presents the object itself. In the LI, however, Husserl did not yet consider whether feelings are directed towards underlying presentations or whether they are directed towards their own object, which he later considers to be values. Am I pleased simply about some “pleasing” presentation, or am I instead pleased at something positive? His latter theory is complicated, as it introduces a distinction between different act-classes (i.e. practical vs. emotional vs. theoretical) as well as a distinction between different intentional objects (the assumption of which he so far had excluded). The theory of feelings as value-directed then leads to Scheler’s Ethics and Husserl’s later lectures on ethics and value theory. However this may be, it is clear that taking feelings to be intentional leads to a rejection of the psychologist theory that feelings are caused by a presentation (LI2, 108). As we (hopefully) know by now, the
“relation” between act and object is not determined by causality, and does not happen in space. Finally, Husserl makes a distinction between intentional feelings and non-intentional feeling-sensations, the latter of which can be part of acts (similar to sensations and sense-fields).

**Act quality and act matter**

By “matter of an act” Husserl does not mean the “constituents of the act as such” (LI2, 120); rather, as he says (as a follow-up to what was mentioned above), what is shared between acts and to what all these acts are ultimately directed, is their meaning. Again, as Husserl developed his concept of the noema later (starting in 1908), he does not yet see that the object towards which an act is directed has itself its how and its givenness. In the LI he simply assumes that there are different acts with different act-qualities that can be directed towards an object, independent from the question of whether the object intended is ideal, real, or non-existent. The matter, then, is the “content” that allows one to be directed towards a specific object, i.e. “that element in an act which first gives it reference to an object” (LI2, 121). “Matter” is here the presentational aspect, i.e. the criterion that makes it this act and not another act. Husserl calls this “Auffassungssinn” (sense of apperception). This distinction should remind us of Frege’s distinction between sense and meaning. As Husserl is, in the LI, primarily interested in pure logic, he does not spend much time analyzing the whole range of intentionality and instead he focuses on semantic acts that are directed towards idealities.

**Repetition**

As Lotz had the impression that students had a difficult time following “the master,” here are the most important points summarized: [1] intentionality is independent from whether the object exists or not (existence, as we will see in the next class, no longer plays any role in phenomenology); [2] if [1] is correct, then only the descriptive character of intentional acts are decisive for determining what and how they are; [3] an act has the following components: [3.1.] intentional act, [3.2] non-intentional moments, such as sensations and non-intentional feelings, [3.3.] act quality, such as doubt, certainty, hypothetical, questionable, judgment, imagination, recollection, [3.4] matter, which is the presentation aspect of an act, i.e., the presentation that makes the directedness towards the intentional object possible. In addition, we have [4.1] the intentional object and [4.2.] its sameness/identity. The intentional object is not a real part of the intentional act, but nevertheless, it is not transcendent in the naturalistic sense. This is why Husserl speaks in Ideas I of immanent transcendence, which might sound odd, but if one takes into account that we are referring here to descriptive elements that are won through ideation (and not through empirical description), then it should be clear what is meant. Finally, act correlations are a priori.

**Distinction between LI and Ideas I (selection)**

[1] LI: phenomenology as pure psychology; ID: phenomenology as transcendental phenomenology
[2] LI: status of act matter remains unclear (seems to be part of the act, on the one hand it is shared, on the other hand it is the specific presentational aspect); ID: introduction of the noema as the givenness of the object in its how, the noema is not part of the act
[3] LI: consciousness as a bundle, non-egological theory of consciousness; ID: introduction of the pure ego that is active in every act; as a consequence, H. introduces affectivity into his conception of intentionality
[4] LI: no attention to time; ID: synthetic character of consciousness as temporal synthesis, time as absolute level; introduction of concept of passive synthesis

**Questions:** Nope. Brilliant class by our honorable teacher, Prof. Lotz: hurray!