

last decade and the arguments are therefore presented on a very high level.³ On the other hand, Husserl wrote more on "concrete phenomena" than most (non-Husserlian) scholars know; especially since in the English speaking world scholars tend only to be familiar with Husserl's main published works. Thus, although we can find many manuscripts, in which Husserl deals with animals, it will probably not be very successful to push Husserl into current research on animals nor into the ethical debate about them. Nevertheless, it does seem to be reasonable to consider Husserl's reflections on the status of animals *within* his own theoretical framework, which is the primary intention of this essay.⁴ By doing this, we not only shift our attention to some unexplored sides of Husserl's thinking, but we also give ourselves the opportunity to shake some of our fundamentally "mistaken" conceptions about the founder of phenomenology, especially since our consideration will force us to rethink the general distinctions that we draw between eidetic, pure and ontological concepts. For "the" animal seems to be located somewhere in between these distinctions, the consequence of which is that Husserl implicitly rethinks his fundamental conceptual decision through his reflections on what *we both are and are not*, namely animals.

As many scholars know, Husserl was confronted with the "revival" of anthropology through thinkers such as Scheler, Plessner, Driesch, von Uexküll and later on through Buytendijk and Gehlen. He was also confronted with this revival through Heidegger's lecture on *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, since in this text Heidegger talked about animals (1929/30).⁵ This historic network, which consisted of anti-Husserlian clusters, affected Husserl's thinking more than we are able to see if we restrict ourselves to examining only the surface of transcendental phenomenology.⁶

If we follow Husserl in his "manuscript jungle" we quickly recognize that he shifts his own theory towards the question of the anthropological world and the question of man and animal in his later period. Implicitly, anthropological considerations become a central focus in all of Husserl's later writings.⁷ For instance, in *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl uses mainly the word "human beings," which indicates a change in his "normal" philosophical vocabulary, and in the context of the *Crisis*, Husserl reflects explicitly on the question of how human beings as human beings are constituted *within* the transcendental dimension. Moreover, the additional volume on the *Crisis*, which ap-

Psyche or Person?

Husserl's Phenomenology of Animals.

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Abstract. Husserl was confronted with the revival of anthropology through thinkers such as Scheler, Heidegger, Plessner, Driesch, von Uexküll and Buytendijk. This historic network affected his thinking more than we are able to see if we only examine the surface of transcendental phenomenology. In my paper I shall elucidate Husserl's claims about animals and the "anthropological world." To do this, I shall first consider Husserl's *Ideas II*, since in my view not only is the current research on this text misguided, but when we attend to it closely, we find much to work in it with regarding the "animal question," including Husserl's claim that animal consciousness is not personal but psychic. Second, I will briefly explore Husserl's "intersubjective approach" to animals, which is found in some of his as yet untranslated manuscripts. I will conclude with the thesis that the intersubjective approach to the problematic shifts us back, ultimately, to Husserl's considerations in his *Ideas II*.

Introduction

As is well known, the ontological as well as the moral status of non-human animals¹ has been a philosophical problem from the start of western philosophical thinking.² Animals somehow speak, and yet somehow they do not; somehow they communicate, somehow they do not; somehow they are social creatures, somehow they are not. We can be amused by them, though we are often afraid of them. We can use them for therapies, as well as try to love and even punish them. For indeed, some animals become treasured members of human families.

Despite the status of the "problem of animals" within philosophy, it seems to be quite unusual to connect Husserl's philosophy with such a problem. Husserl's theory, which is often still conceived as an abstract and methodological philosophy, seems to be inappropriate for a demanding approach to the consideration of animals. On the one hand, this view is correct: we can quickly discover that Husserl is unable to contribute to *current* philosophical debates and research about animals, given that these battlefields became quite complex during the

peared in publication a few years ago, is focused on this question. Husserl states in 1933: "Mankind itself belongs to the world, to interpret world ontologically means to interpret mankind's whole and concrete structure." (Hua XV, 617).⁸

I shall develop my reconstruction of Husserl's considerations about animals in two steps. As a first step, I shall refer to Husserl's *Ideas II*, with the intention of elucidating his reflections about animated nature as expressed in this book, since in my view this text is still not adequately considered in the current research.⁹ In a second step, I will point out Husserl's later "intersubjective approach" to animals, after which I will conclude with the thesis that the later problem through which Husserl tries to conceive animals as "alien others" shifts us back, ultimately, to the earlier – ontological – problematic. The discussion of animals, therefore, can help in clarifying basic Husserlian distinctions, such as the distinction between person and psyche.

What I shall not consider, however, are the cultural, historical or even generative aspects of phenomenology,¹⁰ for this issue is better handled within the cultural sciences, especially as animals are inscribed through language, metaphors and symbols in our everyday cultural patterns and historically accumulated experience. Animals are part of our intersubjective life-world and constitute parts of its sense. This is endured by the fact that for some people animals became "friends" and in some cultures animals are part of human daily life and routine. They enter the life-world as intersubjectively constituted beings and extend its horizons. In an additional sense, animals are inscribed in our language, used as symbols and needed for analogies and descriptions. The whole development of modern technology, in fact, refers itself to an analogy with animated nature. Let me give two examples: the fact that we developed airplanes that can "fly" (although they do not fly in the sense of a self-activity), refers to the observation of birds, in such a way that the full meaning of what we call an "airplane" would include animal references to, if we would analyze it as an object of our life-world. Put differently, we would not understand what it means "to fly" without reference to animals that fly. Likewise, we often describe ourselves or our athletic achievements through analogies that refer to animals ("He is as strong as an elephant," "Her movements are cat-like"). And through various forms of media, including television, radio and storybooks, animals are presented as part of our everyday world. In other words, animals are pre-

sent in our world because of its historical development, which includes them as a necessary part of the understanding of our world. Husserl observes in some manuscripts the foothills of those cultural developments and patterns, that is to say, the consequence that the animal became part of our modern homeworld. The animal was humanized, and now is deeply sedimented as a "home comrade" within our historic experience and everyday life.¹¹

Nevertheless, those historical and genetic questions lead us back to the question about the eidetic structure of our "animal experience," especially since before we can ask about the genesis and history of an object, we must have discovered its ontological structure. Ontology, as Husserl puts it, functions as a "guiding thread for questioning back" (further inquiry) [*Leitfaden der Rückfrage*] (Hua XV, 617), which is the basis for any form of genetic phenomenology. Therefore, ontology in the Husserlian sense, is methodologically prior to *any* form of genetic question.

The Ontological Problem

In *Ideas II* Husserl differentiates various kinds of regions of being that are based in his general theory of reason and acts. According to this theory we have to distinguish between three classes of acts: (1) theoretical acts, which refer ideally to being(s), (2) practical-willing acts, which refer, ideally, to purposes, and (3) emotional acts, which refer ideally to values.¹² It is rather interesting that, according to Husserl, we must distinguish between different ontological regions. The first region we can discover is called "material nature," the second region "animated nature," and a third region is referred to as the "historic, cultural or social surrounding world" [*Umwelt*]. On the basis of these different regions, respectively, Husserl draws the distinction between nature, soul or consciousness, and person.¹³

At the beginning of his reflections about animated nature in *Ideas II*, Husserl surprises his readers, because he *identifies* the soul of human beings and the soul of animals. Both appear, according to Husserl, in connection with "material bodies" [*materiale Leiber*] (Hua IV, 33), by which he means localized spatial characteristics and qualities of things that are constituted through causal circumstances. Although Husserl speaks afterwards only about *the human being* and

no longer about *the animal*, we nevertheless are led to suppose that Husserl does not make any distinction between his concept of man and his concept of animal at this level of the problem. Instead, *both animal and man* belong to the "sense layer" of our world that Husserl calls in *Ideas II* "nature," and in his later works "anthropological world," both of which are constituted *within* the transcendental dimension.

In general, Husserl conceives the phenomenon "animal" as being exactly the kind of sense (*Sinn*) that is constituted whenever we describe consciousness *with the prospect of and regarding* its natural and causal circumstances, as well as regarding its lived body. In other words, we find the sense (*Sinn*) layer called "psyche" or "animal" if we conceive pure consciousness from a specific perspective that we take up towards it. Whenever we interpret consciousness *as natural*, that is to say, *within and in relation to its causal circumstances*, we find a psyche and a body. To put it still in other words, the discovery of soul and nature is dependent on another *attitude*. In anticipation of our further explanations, we can add that the anthropological world and the animal emerge whenever we abstract from the historic dimension of consciousness as well as when we refer to a consciousness through its features, its qualities and their intuitive fulfillment. However, in this first case we do not conceive consciousness as an individuated development. For Husserl, psyche or soul can be described in analogy to things. In other words, *if* we conceive consciousness as something that has qualities or certain features, we describe it *as if* it would be a thing. For example: if I describe myself as something that can be either friendly or unfriendly, I have already interpreted myself as something that has two qualities, namely "friendliness" and "unfriendliness." In the flow of our experiences, those qualities can either be fulfilled in the Husserlian sense of intuition or they can remain unfulfilled. According to Husserlian principles, we are still on the level of the animated soul and within the realm of nature. Souls are *like* things. I shall clarify this position next.

[A] The phenomenon "psyche" – which is consciousness that is understood by itself *as psyche* – turns up through indications of intellectual or sensual dispositions, psychic faculties or characteristics. The psyche has to be understood as a unity and substrate of those faculties, under which Husserl subsumes, firstly, intelligence, such as calculating; secondly, bodily movements or sensual faculties, such as vision

or taste; and thirdly, psychic features, such as "aggression" or "friendliness" (Hua IV, 122). The psyche, conceived as a unity of sense, indicates itself *through* its features. It can be fulfilled *as* a unity in the process of experience and can be ascribed to animated beings. From this it follows that Husserl ascribes to animals exactly the same psychic characteristics that he ascribes to human beings. In a first glance, Husserl's thesis sounds problematic, because one could ask whether the mice who frolic through the backyard of my house, or whether the spiders who live under my carpets, can be described as "shrewd," "friendly" or "intelligent." However, for Husserl the crucial point is not whether we can ascribe *specific* characteristics to animals; rather, what is crucial is the more central fact that we understand animal psyches *in principle* as a unity of qualities that can be fulfilled or negated in some way or another. In other words, the mouse that I observe in my backyard, displaying certain characteristics, usually acts in a typical and ruled manner. I understand the mouse because she has qualities such as being "funny," "nervous" or "aggressive," and those characteristics always re-appear when I observe the mouse under specific circumstances, that is to say, within her natural environment. For instance, when the mouse sees me, she might run away in a funny manner. Obviously, in this case I understand the mouse as a sort of "system" with typical "behaviors," that is to say, as a substrate with certain *indicated* properties (characteristics) to be fulfilled in our experience and expressed through the lived body. The mouse behaves in a typical manner within similar situations through which the indications are fulfilled, the consequence of which is that the *general* mouse becomes a *specific* mouse for the observer. In other words, I can refer to my mouse as something that has a *character*.

[B] "Psychic properties," as Husserl puts it in *Ideas II*, "are unities of manifestation" (Hua IV, 121).¹⁴ Let us take an example: if I get a new cat, she enters my world as an unfamiliar object that has just a few features. This unfamiliarity will change into familiarity after some time. In this sense I get to know my cat, and after some time I know what my cat is *typically* doing. Nevertheless, from the start I have understood my cat as something that has yet unexplored (but indicated) properties, which can be *possibly* fulfilled in the future.

Someone could raise the objection that Husserl's view that we usually get to know only animals that we have already integrated into our homeworlds is too restrictive. I.e., are we able to make such a claim

about animals in general? Dogs and cats are part of our culture and can be conceived through the process of fulfillment as characters. For instance, dog owners can identify their dogs immediately in a group of similar looking dogs. They are able to do so because for them their dogs are constituted as characters over time. But what am I able to say about pigeons, or about the mice that live in the bushes behind my house? After a closer look, we can see that, following Husserl, *it is possible* that I could get to know my mice, especially if I invested enough time and the right instruments to observe these creatures. After some time, I would even learn to *differentiate* my mice. Where other people would only see two "mice," without any possibility of making a difference between them, I would be able to see two *different* psyches with *different* behaviors, and I would be able to identify them even within thousands of other mice. Even if I don't have the right instruments to observe them and my attempt to differentiate failed, I presuppose that I am *in principle* able to get to know them and their *different characters*. In other words, according to the *Ideas II*, a character is dependent on the *attitude* towards animated beings and the result of *becoming familiar* with animated beings *and* their properties.

[C] At the next level of Husserl's considerations, we discover that the psyche is just one specific self-interpretation, constituted by transcendental consciousness. According to Husserl's *Ideas II*, we must draw a distinction between psyche and person. Husserl's remarks are rather difficult to accept, however, because one must understand that person and psyche are just *two different ways of interpreting the same (transcendental) consciousness*. They are not substantially different from each other. Nevertheless, we can see that Husserl does think that animals lack the constitutive layer of personality and spirit [*Geist*], namely for two reasons. First, animals lack individuality because individuality is opposed to typical behavior and constituted throughout its own history. Second, animals lack individuality because we do not have any chance to conceive animals *independently from their natural circumstances*, that is to say, in regard to their bodies.¹⁵ In Husserlian words, animals cannot be conceived within the personalistic attitude. Animals have a *necessary* connection to their bodily appearance (because they are just psyches), persons have not.¹⁶ Husserl writes:

That is to say, if we could eliminate all spirits from the world, then that is the end of nature. But if we eliminate nature, 'true', Objective-

intersubjective existence, there always still remains something [...]. (Hua IV, 297)¹⁷

In addition, we must come to the conclusion that the psychic character of my cat is not an *individual* one in the strong sense of the word, because the psyche is constituted only through *typical* features and properties. "It must not be forgotten here," as Husserl puts it, "that individuality in the spiritual sense is something quite different from individuality in nature" (Hua IV, 298). The so-called individuality of my cat is at best only a natural individuality; any "spiritual" or "personal" individuality, however, is an illusion. According to Husserl, if another cat comes into my world that has exactly the same typical bodily characteristics and behaviors, that is to say, the same movements, the same facial expression, etc., it would be impossible to differentiate both cats as *conscious* individuals or persons, since I have no chance to find characteristics of the cats that are *not* connected to natural circumstances.

Indeed, according to Husserl, the spiritual and personal constitution of consciousness comes to pass because we do not need to conceive consciousness within its typical circumstances (*Geist*). Rather, personality is constituted in terms of its history, in the sense of what the Germans call "Bildung." A person forms herself *through* her own experiences, her own will, decisions and valuations, her own freedom. Consequently a person is, according to Husserl, a "bearer of its habituality, and that implies that it has its individual history" (Hua IV, 300). To give an example: a person can become "older" in the strict sense of the word. She can learn and become "wise," because her personal formation is connected to "reason" [*Vernunft*] and to a normative basis of consciousness.¹⁸ A Husserlian cat can only become older in connection to her bodily appearance, but she is unable to develop her character throughout temporal self-constitution, that is, *Bildung*. She can neither become a "better" person nor transform into an evil one. "Animal excellence" in the moral sense is not an *intrinsic* possibility of my cat. In other words, she lacks *non-psychic time*. The spiritual level is *auto-constituted* and therefore it does not have to be conceived in terms of bodily schemas. In his *Crisis* Husserl writes: "It is the person that is becoming in its life. Its being is continually becoming." (Hua VI, 272).¹⁹ According to Husserl, we can understand animals *as if* they make decisions, but those decisions are conceived *as qualities* or features of a substrate, and they are not conceived as

historical formations on their own, through which a personality characterized by features, such as dignity, values, decisions and other experiences, is formed. My cat can have awful experiences, but she is unable to experience destiny, dramas or tragedies, because those experiences are built upon self-formation and an autoconstituted self-related history of its own. All the dead mice and dead birds that my cat brought into my house are part of her character; they belong to her psychic experience, but according to Husserl, those experiences do not form a substantial personality. Nothing is built up through *intrinsic* learning and reason.²⁰

I would like to turn now, in a last step, to Husserl's later considerations about animals, because – as Husserl puts it – we have to “conceive static layers [...] and their ongoing constitution of surrounding worlds as individual genesis” (Hua XV, 611), which forces us to take the problem of intersubjectivity into consideration.²¹

The Intersubjective Problem

The introduction of the intersubjective problem of animals is not really a new dimension within Husserl's thinking. The heart of the matter can be seen in Husserl's attempt to understand animals in the context of his theory of the constitution of space and body through intersubjectivity, and the constitution of another's psyche through empathy.²² Below, I sketch his main thought.

[A] First, according to the later Husserl, we constitute through intersubjectivity an objective world that he calls “nature.” Nature, seen from this point of view, is the *ideal* correlate of all subjective references to the world. In order to identify things as *things* we have to presuppose intersubjective processes of unification. To grab things, to point at things, or even to look at things in the world, implies relations to others. The first level of this intersubjective constitution is the objective world, which can be described as an ideal correlate that lacks any sense of purpose and value, that is to say, the objective world is a world that has no reference to will and emotions. It is a pure spatial and bodily world, which we all have to acknowledge when we begin to interact, and animals are part of this intersubjective process.

For example, when I see my cat running around a tree, then I am only able to understand her because I think that she sees the tree as

well. The tree is, in this situation, an intersubjective thing within a world that I share with my cat. *If I* observe my cat looking out of the window, then her and my look *together* constitute the world. In this situation, *the* world is *our* world, and the animal other in this basic sense is already inscribed in my experience.

[B] Second, the constitution of the objective world is a bodily process. In his later thought, Husserl anticipates Merleau-Ponty's consideration of animals in his lectures about nature. Our movements and body schemata bring forth a world of “flesh” that is shared with animals. Movements of horses, as Husserl puts it, are only understandable because I experience the movements of the horse *as if* I would stretch and move myself in the way that a horse does. These empathic processes are constituted through bodily associations.

[C] Third, psychic faculties of animals are constituted through the modification [*Abwandlung*] of my own faculties. Even if I ask myself what it is like to be a bat, and what it is like to use sonar, I am only able to understand my considerations because I imply that the bat has a better hearing *than me*. In this sense the animal is just *another other* who is related to *my* Ego. Every modification of my experience through an animal is still a modification of *my own Ego*. For instance, tentacles are understood because they are *like* my fingers. This anthropomorphism is, according to Husserl, a necessary part of our experience, and it leads us to the point at which we realize that we must define the animal as an a-normal experience of our own experience, given that as we encounter in interaction with animals our own experience in *other* possibilities.²³

Interestingly, since the animal belongs only to the intersubjective constitution of nature, without even recognizing this move, Husserl pushes the problematic back to the level of the *Ideas II*, insofar as he maintains that animals are not part of a shared world that is constituted through will and emotions, that is to say, through purpose and value. By focusing on nature, the animal problem leads Husserl back to his earlier theory of personality. According to this thesis, animals are not “bearers of a historic world” [*Träger einer historischen Welt*] (Hua XV, 180), and therefore they do not have a “historic time” (Hua XV, 181). This is to say that they do not grasp themselves in a coherent connection between generations and their history. No knowledge is transported or accumulated throughout history for animals. In other words, animals do not belong to the world of the spirit; they are

not constituted, as Husserl puts it in a late manuscript, within "an individual genesis" (Hua XV, 611). Thus, while it seems to be the case that even the theory of intersubjectivity fails to bring out a new point in Husserl's theory, his theory does attempt to explain why the world of our "animal others" is still only a shared world of nature. Although animals became our "homecomrads" in modern times, they are unable to share our world of moral claims, and values. Neither can they share our moral recognitions and negations. Thus, at least if one wants to follow in Husserl's footsteps, the talk of "animal others"²⁴ in phenomenology should be reconsidered.

Notes:

¹ For simplicity's sake I shall refer hereafter to non-human animals as "animals."
² I would like to thank Dieter Lohmar for his comments on an earlier version of this paper as well as Corinne Painter for her critique, advice and corrections of other versions of this manuscript. According to Husserl's *Ideas II* both human and non-human animals belong to the animated world, which is characterized through the natural interpretation of body and psyche, as well as through their connection.
³ See especially these new contributions to the debate about the moral and ontological status of animals: Scruton, Roger, *Animal Rights and Wrongs*, London: Metro Books 2000; Cavalieri, Paola, *The Animal Question: Why Non-human Animals Deserve Human Rights*, tr. Catherine Woollard, Oxford University Press 2001; DeGrazia, David, *Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status*, Cambridge University Press 1996; Scully, Matthew, *Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy*, New York: St. Martin's 2002. The classical text is still Singer, Peter, *Animal Liberation*, reissued with a new preface, Ecco (HarperCollins) 2002.

⁴ So far there has been little research done on this question. See especially the special edition of Alter, which includes the following articles: Beck, Philippe, "Question de projection animale," in: *Alter* 3 (1995), 27-37, and Cabestan, Philippe, "La constitution de l'animal dans les *Idees*," in: *ibid.*, 39-79; Depraz, Natalie, "Qu'est-ce que l'animalité transcendante?," in: *ibid.*, 81-114; Houillon, Vincent, "Pauvrement habite l'animal ...," in: *ibid.*, 115-150; Soysal, Ahmet, "Immanence et animalité," in: *ibid.*, 151-165; and – for general anthropological considerations – see Kühn, Rolf, "Animalität, Sexualität und 'Urkind'," in: *ibid.*, 345-381. General considerations on animals within the tradition of continental philosophy can be found in Steeves, Peter (Ed.), *Animal Others. On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life*, New York: State University of New York Press 2000.

⁵ See especially McNeill, William, "Life beyond the Organism: Animal Being in Heidegger's Freiburg Lectures, 1929-30," in Peter Steeves (Ed.), *Animal Others, On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life*, New York: State University of New York Press 2000, 197-249. McNeill tries to push Heidegger's considerations into the French debate about "Ecopolitics." The difference between Husserl and Heidegger must be seen in Husserl's lack of a broader analysis of the concept of environment; for Husserl conceives environment primarily as a problem of the constitution of space and the other's body.

⁶ Husserl's personal comments about his historic environment and the anthropological atmosphere he was working in are rare. Even in his letters, he seldomly refers in detail to other positions, although in 1930 Husserl refers implicitly to Scheler and Heidegger in a lecture entitled "Phenomenology and Anthropology" that was delivered for the Kant Society. However, while Husserl mentions anthropology in the lecture title, he does not talk about anthropology at all. Nevertheless, besides Husserl's reflection on the animated world in *Ideas II*, anthropological considerations can be found in Hua IX, XIII-XV as well as in the second *Crisis* volume.

⁷ For Husserl's references to cultural anthropology see San Martin, Javier, "Husserl and cultural anthropology, Commentary on Husserl's letter to Levy-Bruhl," in: *Recherches Husserliennes* 7 (1997), 87-115. And for a systematic approach to the problem see Richir, Marc, "Métaphysique et phénoménologie: Prologomènes pour une anthropologie phénoménologique," in: Eliane Escoubas; Bernhard Waldenfelds (Eds.): *Phénoménologie française et phénoménologie allemande - Deutsche und französische Phänomenologie*, Paris: L'Harmattan 2006 (Cahiers de philosophie de l'Université de Paris XII - Val de Marne; 4), 103-128.

⁸ All translations in this paper, except the references to Husserl's *Ideas II*, are my own. ["Und die Menschheit gehört selbst zur Welt, Welt ontologisch auslegen ist Menschheit darin auslegen in ihrer gesamten und konkreten Struktur"].

⁹ Most of the current debates focus on the problem of the body, without taking into account that Husserl's phenomenology of the body has its place within a broader ontological conception of the connection between psyche, body and person. A very good overview of research on the *Ideas II* can be found in: Nenon, Thomas, Embree, Lester (Eds.), *Issues in Husserl's Ideas II*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1996 (Contributions to phenomenology; 24), 135-160. See especially Ullrich Meille's contribution "Nature and Spirit," in: *ibid.*, 15-35.

¹⁰ See especially Steinbock, Anthony, *Home and Beyond. Generative Phenomenology after Husserl*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1995.

¹¹ An example of a detailed analysis of the animal as comrade can be found in Elisabeth Behnke's reflections on the possibility of an "intercorporeal/interspecies body of peace." See Behnke, Elisabeth, "From Merleau-Ponty's Concept of Nature to an Interspecies Practice of Peace," in: Steeves, Peter (Ed.), *Animal Others, On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life*, New York: State University of New York Press, 93-116.

¹² The origin of this theory within the post-idealistic German philosophy of the 19th century, especially through Herbart, will not be explored in this essay. For a general overview of the historical background see Wolfhart Henckmann's introduction to Herbart, Johann F., *Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Hamburg: Meiner 1993. For an overview of the distinctions that Husserl draws see Melle, Ullrich, "Objektivierende und nicht-objektivierende Akte," in *Husserl-Ausgabe und Husserl-Forschung*, ed. Samuel Ijsseling, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1990, 35-49.

¹³ Because sciences are built upon these ontological distinctions, Husserl introduces a phenomenology of the science of nature, of psychology and of the humanities [Geisteswissenschaften]. However, I do not have to go into detail about this here, inasmuch as I am only concerned with showing at which point Husserl begins to introduce his concept of the animal.

¹⁴ "Seelische Eigenschaften sind ... Einheiten der Bekundung."

¹⁵ See Hua IV, 124: "Die Seele (bzw. das seelische Subjekt) verhält sich unter den zugehörigen Umständen und in geregelter Weise." In other words, the constitution of a psyche is always dependent on its circumstances and is ruled by them.

¹⁶ Husserl holds the position that animals cannot think *theoretically* (see Hua IV, 134), which is Scheler's opinion as well. Scheler remarks that animals are unable to

have eidetic, that is to say conceptual, insights. See Scheeler, Max, *Gesammelte Werke IX*, Bern 1954 ff., 40.

¹⁸ „Nämlich, streichen wir alle Geister aus der Welt, so ist keine Natur mehr. Streichen wir aber die Natur, das ‚wahre‘, objektiv-intersubjektive Dasein, so bleibt noch immer etwas übrig [...]“.

¹⁹ The consequence of Husserl's consideration is the thesis that animals do not have „culture“ since culture is constituted through human actions and the creation of purposes (see Hua XV, 180), and see Hua XV, 181: „A bee does not act.“ For an overview of Husserl's conception of spirit in *Ideas II* see especially Drummond, John J., „The 'spiritual' world: The personal, the social, and the communal,“ in: Thomas Nenon / Lester Embree (Eds.): *Issues in Husserl's Ideas II*. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996 (Contributions to phenomenology: 24), 237-254.

²⁰ „Das in diesem Leben werdende ist die Person selbst. Ihr Sein ist immerfort Werdend.“ (Hua VI, 272).

²¹ Husserl writes: „Menschliche Person, die ihre geistige Individualität hat, ihre intellektuellen, praktischen Fähigkeiten und Fertigkeiten, ihren Charakter, ihre Sinesart“ (Hua IV, 139).

²² „die statischen Schichtungen [...] letztlich wie ihre aufsteigende Umweltkonstitution als individuelle Genesis anzusehen“.

²³ See the interesting contribution from Natalie Depraz, „The Husserlian Theory of Intersubjectivity as Alterology: Emergent Theories and Wisdom Traditions in the Light of Genetic Phenomenology,“ in: *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 8 (5-7) (2001), 169-178.

²⁴ See especially appendix X and text 35 in Hua XV.

²⁵ See note 3.

Wie sich Bewusstsein mit Hilfe der Husserlschen Phänomenologie in die (Neuro-)Wissenschaft einbeziehen lässt

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Zusammenfassung: Der Vortrag argumentiert für eine methodologisch kontrollierte Integration wissenschaftlicher, speziell neurowissenschaftlicher Daten bezüglich Bewusstsein und phänomenologischer, Erste-Person-Daten, die mittels Reflexion auf Bewusstseinssergebnisse und deren eidetischer Beschreibung gewonnen werden. Leitend ist der Gedanke, dass für Wissenschaftler, die die Arbeitsweisen des Gehirns mit dem Ziel einer wissenschaftlichen Erklärung von Bewusstsein erforschen, eine klare begriffliche Vorstellung von dem zu erklärenden Gegenstand unerlässlich ist. Zur Diskussion gestellt wird die These, dass gerade phänomenologische Begriffe, in denen das zu bestimmen gesucht wird, was Bewusstseinssergebnisse ihrer Möglichkeit nach ausmacht, eine heuristische Leitfadenfunktion bei neurowissenschaftlichen Experimenten bezüglich aktuell auftretender Bewusstseinssergebnisse ausüben sollten. Am Beispiel von Arbeiten über mentale Vorstellungsbilder und der Suche nach deren neuronalen Korrelaten wird die These näher illustriert und abschließend auf einige methodologische Vorteile dieser Weise der Integration hingewiesen.

Abstract: The paper argues in favor of a methodologically controlled integration of scientific, especially neuroscientific, data concerning consciousness and phenomenological, first-person data that are gathered with the help of reflection upon conscious experiences and their eidetic description. The main idea is that for scientists, when they study the workings of the brain with the aim of looking for a scientific explanation of consciousness, a clear conception of what they are seeking is requisite. The paper proposes that phenomenological concepts by which one seeks to determine that which makes up conscious experiences according to their possibility in principle, should precisely play a heuristic role in neuroscientific experiments concerned with actually occurring conscious experiences. The thesis is illustrated in more detail with regard to work on mental imagery and the search for the neural foundations of imagery. In conclusion some methodological assets of the present proposal for integrating third-person, neuroscientific data and first-person phenomenological data are highlighted.

I. Einleitende Bemerkungen

In ihrem Buch *A universe of consciousness. How matter becomes imagination* beschreiben die Neurowissenschaftler Gerald M. Edel-