

## ¶62 RESOLUTENESS

At the outset, it is important to note that resoluteness [*Entschlossenheit*] is closely related to disclosedness [*Erschlossenheit*], as attested by the German terms. This needs to be kept in mind because Heidegger formulates resoluteness in a variety of ways: “this reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety” (343); “*the authenticity of care itself*” (348); “authentic potentiality-for-Being, in its existentiell attestation” (340), “‘letting oneself be called forth to one’s ownmost *Being-guilty*’ ” (353). Insisting that resoluteness is the authentic mode of disclosedness allows us to see the unity behind these various formulations of resoluteness.

Disclosedness has something to do with the being of the ‘there’. Dasein is thrown possibility, which means that Dasein is opened up to encounter the world which is there for it and it projects itself understandingly upon the possibilities that are there for it. Disclosure, in its undifferentiated sense, was explicated in terms of attunement (¶29), understanding (¶31), and discourse (¶34).<sup>1</sup> In being resolute, Dasein discloses the being of its there in a particular way, i.e., in an authentic way. Resoluteness, as the authentic form of these undifferentiated modes, will have its own forms of disclosure: anxiety (attunement), conscience (discourse), and being-towards-death (understanding).<sup>2</sup> Thus, we see that Heidegger has made good on his promise that “*authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon*” (224).

The various aspects of resoluteness have already been explicated, so one might question whether there is anything new being advanced here. Heidegger has already said that corresponding to authentic being-towards-death—which Heidegger calls “anticipation” [*Vorlaufen*] (¶53)—is the attunement of anxiety.<sup>3</sup> But anticipation was only an ontological possibility, i.e., it revealed only that it would be possible for Dasein to have an authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, without saying whether this is an ontical possibility. This leads Heidegger to ask whether Dasein is ever given to itself as something to be understood—and he answers in the affirmative with the call of conscience. The analysis of resoluteness in ¶60 showed the existentiell possibility of Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-being-one’s-Self. But in II. 3, the issue becomes the whether we can make the leap from this ontical potentiality to the potentiality of Being-a-whole, and this is why Heidegger must bring in anticipation. The thrust of ¶62 is basically to show that resoluteness is already anticipation, and so this *anticipatory* resoluteness is really not a distinct phenomenon, but rather the complete articulation of resoluteness. Anticipatory resoluteness is Dasein’s disclosure as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole; *Anticipatory* being-towards-death provides the wholeness of Dasein, while *resoluteness* indicates that it is a wholeness that I myself am and can take over.

So much, then, for the necessity of anticipatory resoluteness in Heidegger’s overall analytic of Dasein. I hope to have made clear why anticipatory resoluteness sounds like a re-articulation of terrain that Heidegger has already covered. Elucidating the meaning of resoluteness, however, is much more confusing because it brings into play every aspect of Dasein we have covered so far.

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<sup>1</sup> By ‘undifferentiated’, I mean neither authentically nor inauthentically. This expression makes me nervous, though I think it is correct. We had discussed attunement, discourse, and understanding as ways in which Dasein understands itself from out of the world, and hence from what it is not. For this reason, we said that these are all inauthentic modes of disclosure. But I think this might need to be revised. It seems to me that the structure of disclosure that Heidegger has previously interpreted is neither authentic nor inauthentic—it is rather that of average everydayness, which Heidegger calls ‘undifferentiated’. See p. 69.

<sup>2</sup> Here it would be helpful to reference Lotz’s diagram, “Heidegger’s Critique of Intentionality.”

<sup>3</sup> “*But the state-of-mind which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself arising from Dasein’s ownmost individualized Being, is anxiety*” (310).

Heidegger says, “We have characterized resoluteness as a way of reticently projecting oneself upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty and exacting anxiety of oneself” (353). Dasein hears the call of conscience, which summons it back to itself from its lostness in *Das Man*. Dasein listens to itself, but what it hears is nothing at all. Dasein stands out in a world, but always in such a way that it cannot wholly identify with it. We are *not* the entities in the world. We are *not* the possibilities that we exist. To project itself upon the call of conscience, then, Dasein must appropriate that it is “the null basis of its own nullity” (354), which is the meaning of guilt. Our guilt can be seen as a recognition that in existing certain possibilities, we have always *not* existed others. Conscience seems to remind us of our non-identity with the world of concern and that we can never completely control our destiny—this is because Dasein is, essentially, a *not*.

If Dasein can appropriate this nullity, it finds itself to be uncanny, or not at home. The world that fascinates us but which never wholly absorbs us and the possibilities we can never fully become remind us that we can never be at home. Further, this Being-guilty is something we must understand as *constantly* present. As long as Dasein is (and whether or not Dasein has this Being-guilty in view), Dasein is limited not just at certain times, but always, and being resolute means holding that constantly in view. I am here reminded of a friend who said he would love to get married . . . if he had a second life to live. His appropriation of his bachelorhood was not just a fleeting decision that he might make from time to time, but already had the entirety of his life in view. Thus, we can see that the resolution “harbours in itself authentic Being-towards-death” (353).

To conclude, we have seen that the driving force behind being-towards-death and conscience has been the ontic possibility of Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. The authentic potentiality-for-Being, which we can now call anticipatory resoluteness, has been given an “existentiell attestation.”<sup>4</sup> This attestation reveals resoluteness as disclosive of Dasein’s thrownness into being the null basis of its own nullity, which Dasein must take over as being situated already within certain possibilities, i.e., In resoluteness, Dasein “*gives* itself the current factual Situation, and *brings* itself into that Situation” (355).

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<sup>4</sup> Heidegger says, “The question of the potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is one which is factual and existentiell. It is answered by Dasein as resolute . . . The question of Dasein’s totality, which at the beginning we discussed only with regard to ontological method, has its justification, but only because the ground for that justification goes back to an ontical possibility of Dasein” (357).